Background
Hixon is a village of 1917 people (as of 2011) in central England, located in the West Midlands region 40km/25mi north of Birmingham and 73km/45.5mi south of Manchester (both measurements in linear distance).
Hixon is passed on its western side by the West Coast Main Line, a double- to six-tracked electrified main line connecting London with Glasgow (Scotland) along England’s western coast. Opening in sections between 1837 and 1869 the line is one of the UK’s main railway corridors, carrying all sorts of passenger services along with 40% of the UK’s freight traffic, making it one of the busiest freight-corridors in Europe. Nowadays the entire line is electrified via overhead catenaries and is set up for speeds of up to 200kph/125mph.
Hixon is connected to nearby Stafford by road, which at the time crossed the rail line (which is double-tracked at the site) with a recently automated level crossing after British Railways (BR) had found increasing difficulty in recruiting crossing guards while also seeking to minimize the wait for road traffic. The system installed at Hixon in 1967 allowed the barriers to be shut for under a minute, compared to 3–4 minutes in manual operation. The closing-sequence of the level crossing (flashing lights, a loud bell and finally the lowering of half-width barriers over the road) was activated by trains passing a sensor 910m/1000yd from the crossing with no need for human interference.
The vehicles involved
1A41 was an express passenger service from Manchester to London Euston consisting of twelve Mk1 and Mk2 four axle express passenger cars and, on the day of the accident, was pulled by BR Class AL1 number E3009. The AL1, later redesignated the Class 81, is a four-axle multipurpose electric locomotive. Introduced in 1959 the AL1 was BR’s first AC electric locomotive, with 25 units being delivered over 5 years, 2 of which (designated “Type B”) being geared for a lower top speed with exclusive freight use in mind. E3009 was not one of those two, and thus had the higher top speed of 161kph/100mph. Each AL1 measures 17.22m/56.6ft in length at a weight of 80.9 metric tons. The report lists the train’s weight at 491 metric tons (including the locomotive), and claims approximately 300 passengers. The locomotive was staffed by 3 men, a driver, his assistant and a second driver who was just riding along without being involved in the operation of the train.
A disused former Air Force base to the immediate northeast of the crossing was used by the English Electric Company (EE) as a storage facility, including large equipment related to high voltage electrical infrastructure. Most of the objects stored there came from the EE’s factory at Stafford, just across the train tracks from the storage facility, approximately 5km/3mi linear distance to the west. On the day of the accident a 120 metric ton transformer was to be taken to the storage facility by road, for which EE contracted Wynns, a specialized heavy haulage company. For the trip the transformer was mounted on a special 16-axle low-loader trailer (which had a steering cab at the end to help maneuver the massive vehicle), hanging between two “gooseneck” couplers attaching it to the low-loader with a high-power truck pulling from the front while another one pushed from the rear. The report lists a weight of 162 metric tons at a total length of 45m/148ft. Driving the, as contemporary sources put it, “behemoth”, was Mister Groves, assisted by Mister Illsley in the rear truck and 3 assistants spread between the trailer’s steering cab and the truck’s surroundings (walking along on foot). To ensure a safe journey the transport also received a police escort and had to adhere to a predetermined and approved route.
No photos of the truck before the accident seem to exist, but the report provides a comparative photo and a photo of a scale model.
The accident
On the 6th of January 1968 a heavy transport carrying a 120 metric ton transformer for the English Electric Company turns into Station Road (since renamed “New Road”) just after noon. It’s origin, EE’s factory at Stafford, was less than 10km/6mi from its destination, the disused Hixon Air Force Base, but the route approved by the Ministry of Transport saw the convoy (two trucks, a special low-loader, and a police escort) take a detour south out of Stafford, then north via the M6 Motorway, on to the A34 and finally A51 main roads before ending up on Station Road which would take them across the railway line and right up to the entrance of EE’s storage facility at the former airbase. Notably, the ministry’s paperwork made no mention of the level crossing. Mister Groves, who drove the leading truck, however, had been told about it by EE’s head of heavy transports, but just as a landmark to know when he’d reach the entrance to the storage facility. It wasn’t a wildly unusual operation, being the seventh such transport in just a few months.
The rails in the ground in combination with the overhead wires limited vertical clearance at the crossing to 5.03m/16ft6in. Under normal operation the truck was 5.11m/16ft9in high, but a special suspension system allowed it to reduce its height to as little as 4.95m/16ft3in. Still a tight fit, but it would manage to pass through the gap with a little bit of space to spare.
The truck stops after turning into Station Road while the police car in front crosses the railway line, returning shortly thereafter with the officer reporting that they’re in the right place and that the entrance is up ahead. The truck’s crew proceeds to lower the suspension system, but can’t take full advantage of the suspension’s motion range as it would leave the trailer too low to clear the railway tracks sticking up above pavement-level. This leaves them with very little room above the truck, having to stay clear of the high voltage overhead wires. Upon approaching the level crossing Mister Groves slows the truck to 3.2kph/2mph, giving the 3 assistants walking alongside time to closely observe clearances and adjust the suspension as needed.
At 12:26pm the leading truck has crossed the rail lines, at which point another minute would have been needed to clear the crossing entirely. It’s just at that moment that the express train from Manchester to London Euston passes the sensors 910m/1000yd up the line, activating the level crossing’s closing sequence. The train comes around a long right hand turn a moment later, establishing visual contact with the truck on the crossing at a distance of approximately 366m/400yd. The speed limit on that section of the line is set at 85mph with trains heading southbound navigating a slight downhill gradient, meaning a train like the approaching express would require 1.39km/1520yd to come to a standstill after an emergency stop is triggered. Almost 4 times the distance they have available.
Mister Groves, who later wouldn’t recall hearing the bells and couldn’t see the barriers from his cab, sees the train approach and realizes in an instant that a collision is imminent. He shouts a warning to his assistants to get clear of the crossing before applying full throttle. Mister Illsley does the same in the rear truck, fully knowing that, at best, they might manage to get the transformer off the tracks. Which would bring him into the path of the train, destined for a likely fatal impact.
Seconds later the locomotive strikes the rear left hand corner of the transformer at 121kph/75mph, 24 seconds after activating the crossing. The impact shears the low-loader in two right behind its cargo and throws the transformer aside, crushing the locomotive’s leading cab in the process. The locomotive and the forward five passenger cars derail and suffer extensive or total destruction, with the following three train cars still derailing but remaining mostly intact. The three men aboard the locomotive are killed in the collision, along with eight passengers, while 45 passengers are injured.
Aftermath
The officers from the escorting police car notify authorities of the crash immediately after the accident, as does one of the surviving passengers, an off-duty train driver’s assistant, who flags down a passing motorist to take him to a nearby home to call the emergency services. The derailment destroys the train tracks on a distance of 110m/120yd and brings down the overhead wires, causing both tracks to show up as “occupied” along with the level crossing going offline at the responsible off-site signal box right before power is cut to the line as the torn overhead wires short out. The signal box worker witnessing the odd report on his control desk figures out that a severe accident of some sort occurred and notifies his superiors who alert emergency services as well.
In the meantime Mister Final, the head conductor on the train, climbs out of the stricken train and sprints 1.6km/1mi up the rail line to the north, attaching detonators and warning flags to the tracks. Detonators, in simplified terms, are extremely powerful firecrackers, which detonate if a train runs over them. The bang, loud enough to be heard over even the loudest locomotive, is a “stop immediately”-order to the driver hearing it. Mister Final also comes across a trackside phone, notifying the signal box, before sprinting back, past the wreckage (by detouring across two fields) and a mile south, attaching flags and detonators to the tracks there as well, before sprinting back to the wreckage and tending to survivors. His quick thinking and the physical feat of sprinting over 6.5km/4mi receives apprechiative mention in the report and thus could not go unmentioned here. He couldn’t know the status of the signals, or if there were any trains approaching, or if the signal box staff had been notified, so he did what he could to keep another train on the busy line from running into the wreckage.
Thanks to the police officers who had escorted the truck emergency services received precise location-information and quickly began showing up on both sides of the blocked crossing, including doctors who were flown in by the army. The commotion also attracted civilians from the surrounding towns, who, in addition to journalists, soon crowded the site. Nobody had set up a perimeter around the wreckage, thus photos from the wreckage are filled with spectators who walked all over the place in a fairly unchecked manner one would never see today. It must have taken some time to comb through the crowd to separate lesser-injured or uninjured survivors from the spectators.
Originally it is suspected that the transport crew lowered the trailer too far, beaching the lengthy vehicle on the crossing and leaving it to be struck by the train as the trucks were unable to pull it free. There had been a near-accident in 1966 where exactly that had occurred to a different transport by Wynns, with the train missing the trailer by inches after the driver managed to unstick his truck at the last moment, gunning his engine so much that his truck reportedly pulled a wheelie. In that case the modernization of the crossing and refurbishing of the road had left a 10cm/4in drop on one side of the tracks, too much for that incident’s truck to navigate. There had been a signalman from a nearby station present, who decided he could best use his time by shouting “you can’t park there!” to the driver rather than attempting to warn the approaching train.
However, when the crew from the collision at Hixon was interrogated after the accident all of them insisted that they had managed to “thread the needle”, not beaching the trailer and also keeping the transformer clear of the overhead wires. They had, in the end, just taken too much time, running over schedule despite the transport being right on schedule until it reached the crossing.
Mister Groves, considered one of the company’s best drivers with 20 years of experience in oversized loads, admitted to police that he had never before encountered an automated level crossing, and wasn’t aware of the short timespan between activation of the closing-sequence and the train reaching the crossing. He explained that he had heard of them being introduced, and that he figured he was approaching one when he saw the sign announcing half-width barriers. He explained that for the entire journey the police escort had made a habit of stopping at intersections, only moving along when it was safe for the transport to do so as well. Thus, despite knowing that the police had no authority over the railway, he assumed the crossing was safe to navigate since the police officers had moved beyond it after initially returning to confirm they had found the destination. Any stretch of road covered by them, he assumed, must be secured for the transport.
Calculations after the accident showed that the transport would have managed to clear the crossing in time had it maintained 9.7kph/6mph throughout its drive down Station Road. Instead, Mister Groves had slowed to 3.2kph/2mph as the truck moved across the tracks. At that speed at least 60 seconds would have been required after the crossing activated, not the 24 seconds they had. Drivers of exceptionally large and/or heavy vehicles were actually meant to call the signal box and ask how long they had before the next train approaches, but nobody involved in the transport had done so.
The officers escorting the transport knew about the existence of automated crossings “in the area”, but were apparently not aware that they would cross one and also didn’t know about the operational process of them. One of the officers later told investigators that he was “astounded by the speed of the whole process”. As such, no safety-note was entered into the paperwork surrounding route-approval that would have told Mister Groves to call anyone. For all he knew, there was no reason to suspect that crossing an automated crossing was any different from crossing a manned one. A sign at the Hixon crossing actually instructed drivers to call, but it was small and deemed easy to miss even from a slow-moving vehicle, especially if a driver was preoccupied with steering a vehicle barely narrower than the road it’s on.
Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate (HMRI) had strictly opposed the installation of telephones at crossings for drivers to use, making them an irregular occurrence where the BR had installed them despite being told not to. It’s assumed that legislation allowing the automation of crossings without providing a phone was meant to support improved flow of traffic, not causing a traffic jam every time a truck or bus driver stops in traffic to go call the signal box.
Mister Gibbens, leader of the public inquiry, made it very clear during public proceedings that he considered everyone at the site on the day of the accident “actors”, seeing those individuals as “mainly victims of shortcomings at more responsible levels”. It came to light that Mister Horton, driver of the truck in the near-miss mentioned above, had confided in his employer (Wynns) that he felt the time-span between the warning and trains approaching at an automated crossing was too short for slow transports or broken down cars requiring a push, leading to Wynns’ forwarding the concerns to BR’s chief civil engineer for the region. The response from BR doesn’t appear to be publicly available, but is referred to as “breathtaking” and “remarkable for its arrogance and lack of insight”, apparently being summed up in: “the slow vehicle is a road-problem, not a rail-problem, thus we are not concerned with changing the rail-system to accommodate it”. Wynns’ lawyers admitted that, looking back, the company should have pursued the matter further rather than letting the tone of the reply shut them up. On the other hand, one has to ask why Wynns didn’t bother more urgently instructing their drivers of how to use an automated crossing, considering the near-miss had concerned them enough to contact BR.
Further fuel was added to the fire of the discussion surrounding level crossing safety when, while the Hixon Inquiry was ongoing, five people were killed when a small car broke down on a level crossing at Beckingham and was struck by a train as the driver attempted to push it off the crossing. The official report blamed the “old car in poor condition” for the accident, not shedding a word on the short time given to the driver to clear the crossing. He also hadn’t had the ability to call the signal box, since there was no phone provided at that crossing.
In the end no single person was blamed for the collision at Hixon. The police officers received insufficient instructions about the level crossing on their route, or automated crossings in general. Mister Groves was focused on not getting his behemoth of a truck stuck in the ditch, beached on the train tracks or roasted by the high voltage overhead wires, thus missing a small sign as he approached the crossing. The BR hadn’t installed roadside phones at a lot of crossings, the one at Hixon included, because legislation passed on demand of their superiors made that an unnecessary expense. Lastly, the train’s crew had no chance to avoid the accident, being left with an impossibly short timespan between getting any knowledge of the obstruction and the collision. The driver did trigger an emergency stop and ever so slightly reduced the speed of the train, which is all he could do.
The report does note that the two truck drivers’ decision to apply full throttle at the last moment likely lessened the consequences of the collision, as it avoided a centered broadside impact of the train into the transformer. The impact into the very back of the transformer’s side meant it could “pivot” somewhat, leading to less forces being inflicted on the train than if it had hit the center of the transformer. The impact as it happened was still estimated at 280 megajoules, comparable to four Class 47 locomotives (117 tons each) hitting a solid, immovable object at 121kph/75mph.
In 1969 improved signage was introduced at level crossings in England instructing drivers of heavy, large and/or slow vehicles to call for permission to cross, listing specific values for “large”, “wide”, “heavy” and “slow”. The signs are referred to as “Post-Hixon signs”. Roadside phones at crossings also finally became the standard, as did automated crossings in the 80s and 90s after their installation initially almost ground to a halt following the accident (only 27 automated crossings were installed in England between 1968 and 1978).
The crossing at Hixon was removed in 2002, being replaced by a bridge to the immediate south of the former crossing. In the process the street was renamed “New Road”.
Wynns disappeared in the 1980s through mergers with other companies, before being revived as “Wynns limited” by the founder’s great-great grandson in 2000, now focussed on special transports on water.
BR E3009 was the first of its type to be pulled from service, being scrapped in August 1968. 23 of its siblings followed suit until July 1991, with only one unit, E3003, being preserved to this day. A number of Mark 1 passenger cars have been preserved at a variety of museums and historic railways, while some Mark 2 passenger cars also still see service with chartered trains and a few units having been exported to New Zealand where they still see regular service. Two Mark 1 cars (4963 and 4973) and a Mark 2 car (5191) from the train involved in the accident at Hixon are actually among the units preserved at historic railways.
A memorial was finally placed in the yard at Hixon’s church, being unveiled on the 6th of January 2018, the accident’s 50th anniversary. The small beige gravestone carries a black stone plate listing the names and ages of all victims in gold lettering.
History repeats itself
Oversized/unusual vehicles remain a safety-risk at level crossings to this day, sometimes with severe or even fatal consequences:
- In March 2015 a special transport carrying a 115 metric ton power distributor through Halifax (USA) unintentionally blocks a level crossing as the driver struggles to navigate a tight turn, causing an incoming passenger train to strike the cargo and derail, injuring 55 people. This transport, like the one at Hixon, had had a police escort and still ended up stuck in the path of a train.
- In February 2016 a regional train in Dalfsen (Netherlands) strikes an elevated work platform negligently driven into a level crossing without sufficient time ahead of the next train, killing the train driver and injuring 6 people. The article covering this accident in detail can be found right here.
- In 2019 poor route-planning leaves a low-loader (comparable to the one at Hixon) carrying a 70 metric ton ram beached on a level crossing at Alt Duvenstedt (Germany), where it’s struck by an approaching regional train. Nobody dies, but 12 people aboard the train are injured, and the truck driver only survives as he manages to abandon his truck at the last second. The article covering this accident in detail can be found right here.
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A kind reader is posting the installments on reddit for me, I cannot interact with you there but I will read the feedback and corrections. You can find the post right here.
