Background
Ankara is a city of 5.8 Million people (as of 2023) in central Turkey, serving as the country’s capital. It is located in the Central Anatolia region 231km/144mi north of Konya and 343km/213mi east-southeast of Istanbul, the country’s largest city (both measurements in linear distance).
The city is the eastern terminus of the Istanbul-Ankara rail line, a single- to five-tracked electrified main line connecting Turkey’s two largest cities. The 577km/359mi line was Turkey’s main rail corridor between it’s completion in 1892 and 2009, by which point the newly opened Ankara-Istanbul high speed rail line (which runs parallel to the existing main line in many places) took the title. The old main line still sees a lot of usage by high speed trains (branded “YHT” for “Yüksek Hızlı Tren”, Turkish for “High Speed Train”) regardless of the new parallel line. However, trains only go as fast as 160kph/99mi on the line.
Marşandiz station is a five-track regional traffic platform in the far east of Ankara, offering a single island-platform for two tracks. Those two, referred to as station tracks, are numbered 1 and 2, while the other three tracks are “line tracks” which are not intended to have trains stop on them and can be navigated at high speeds. Those tracks are numbered H1, H2 and H3 respectively. H1 is situated north of the platform tracks while H2 and H3 are south of them.
The Trains Involved
The YHT-service from Ankara to Istanbul was performed by TCDD (Turkish national railway) HT80101 on the day of the accident. The HT80000 is a high speed electric multiple unit (EMU) introduced into service in Turkey in 2015. It’s a variation of Siemens’ Velaro-Family designated Velaro TR, having “siblings” run in a variety of countries including Germany, Spain and China. Each Velaro TR measures 200m/656ft in length, consisting of eight cars. The 8000kW/10730hp power train is distributed throughout the train below the floors, following the modern standard for high speed trains and eliminating the need for dedicated “power cars”. Half the cars in the train are driven, allowing a top speed of 300kph/186mph while carrying up to 519 passengers in three classes similar to airplane classes. The Velaro-trains easily stand out in Turkish rail traffic as they were given a distinct turquoise livery instead of the white-red-blue standard colors. The train carried 231 passengers at the time of the accident.
Crews at Marşandiz’ rail yard had performed an inspection run on a local stretch of the main line with TCDD E68 041 and travelling eastbound through Marşandiz station at the time of the accident. The TCDD class E68000 is a four-axle electric locomotive introduced in 2013, made by Hyundai. Each unit of the class measures 20m/65ft in length at a weight of 86 metric tons. They are designed to have a 140kph/90mph top speed under the Turkish 25kV/50Hz power supply, but can reach 175kph/109mph in practice as the Turkish railways overvolt their lines to 27.5kV.
The Accident
TCDD E68 041 is returning from a track inspection run early in the morning of the 13th of December 2018, travelling eastbound towards Marşandiz station on track H2. It would have to turn around at the station in order to enter the yard on the western end of the station.A Velaro is providing an YHT-service from Ankara to Istanbul at the same time and departs Ankara main station at 6:30am, just as the inspection trip finishes up a short distance west. The Velaro is running on track H2 as it departs Ankara main station and picks up speed, being given a 90kph/56mph speed limit. The local dispatcher for Marşandiz station, intending to give the prestigious high speed train priority, orders a points guard to direct the single locomotive into track H1 on the western approach to the station. He then clears the Velaro to pass through the station at speed at 6:33am. The high speed train enters the station at 90kph/56mph, at which point its driver might have at most caught a glimpse of the yellow-gray locomotive in his path before impact.
The head-on collision with the near-stationary locomotive launches the leading car of the Velaro upwards, obliterating the locomotive’s forward driver’s cab before crashing through the footbridge connecting the platform to the station building. The resistance from the bridge ends the train’s short flight, causing the leading car to crash back down to earth where its met by the following car which didn’t get launched quite as high. The third car of the Velaro stays on the ground but derails, cars 4–8 come to a rest largely undamaged after the locomotive has been shoved back a considerable distance. Within seconds, both train drivers, a third crew member and 5 passengers lose their lives. Another 87 are injured, 35 of which severely. Much of the fancy high speed train, the locomotive and the footbridge have been turned into a mangled pile of steel and plastic.
Aftermath
Responders reach the site within minutes of the collision occuring, soon over 40 ambulances, 20 firetrucks and countless police officers are involved in the rescue effort. An initial survivor dies after being pulled from the wreckage, bringing the final death toll to 9. Repeated showers of heavy snowfall slow down the rescue and recovery operation even after specialized cranes arrive in the afternoon, but it still takes responders three days to cut their way through the wreckage on the search for victims or survivors before it can be removed from the site.
The dispatcher in charge, the points guard and an inspector of the railway were detained as the investigation got underway, along with records of the trains’ maintenance, their movements and operations at the station being confiscated. Radio communication records and CCTV footage are also secured, but not before the CCTV-footage of the collision is leaked to the public.
The dispatcher is interrogated first, explaining that he ordered the points guard to move the locomotive to track H1, guiding it around the high speed train. He also states that he instructed the driver of the locomotive to pass through the station at low speed. However, he also states during the interrogation that he can’t say for sure that he received confirmation on his order to send the locomotive into H1. The points guard states in his interrogation that he received the order to set a path for the locomotive into H1 and pushed the buttons to set the path, but then didn’t confirm the input (which would actually make the points set themselves as intended).
Investigators latched onto that last part of his statement, inquiring why he didn’t confirm it. He stated that the control board he was using had been installed 4 days prior to the accident, replacing a completely different interface, and that he hadn’t received any training on the new version. Instead, they had even placed him alone on a night shift, without as much as a supervisor to help him. He simply didn’t know that he had to approve the inputs before they would actually be sent to the points.
It didn’t take investigators long to stumble over the fact that having the trains on a collision course should have been completely impossible. The approach signal for the Velaro should have been red for as long as the locomotive was on the same track within the station area, but it had green signals as it approached and subsequently entered the station. The signaling system functioned flawlessly, what had failed was the train detection and protection-system (TDS). And that was for the simple reason that it hadn’t been installed completely by the time of the accident. The chairman of the Turkish transportation union triggered a large-scale controversy when he accused the TCDD’s higher-ups of gross negligence, opening a high speed rail line perfectly on schedule but without the safety system in place. The Minister of Transport and Infrastructure replied with a statement to the media saying that such a system isn’t required to have trains operate.
He was technically right, trains can operate without an automatic protection system watching over them, but modern railways are supposed to always have two parallel safety-measures so the failure of one cannot enable a catastrophic event. In this case, the TDS and the points guard/signal box crew were each other’s backup. A failure of the TDS should have been caught by the signal box crew, and the TDS should have kept the signal box crew from sending trains on a collision course. With the line having been opened without TDS in place there was only the signal box crew meant to ensure safe operations, which failed when the points guard was put in charge of Marşandiz station on a four days old system with zero training or assistance. His failure to follow through on the orders of the dispatcher was then escalated when the dispatcher cleared the Velaro for approach. The points guard had, as far as he could tell, completed the task and reported back as such. The dispatcher, not being required to question the feedback from a points guard, then cleared the train for approach on the occupied track.
The criminal investigation proceeded with an order to arrest the three individuals who had been suspected of being at fault. The dispatcher, the points guard and the inspector who allowed operations to begin without TDS being operational were thus arrested by December 2018 and placed in pretrial custody. They were held on various charges relating to negligent cause of death and bodily harm, but as of May 2024 there appears to be no public result of a criminal trial.
Critics both within Turkey and from abroad have pointed to signs of increasing deterioration of health and safety standards in Turkish infrastructure, accusing the government around president Erdogan of prioritizing, effectively, “shiny new stuff” over proper procedures and operation. The government supposedly wants to focus on new mega-projects, new buildings, expansions of infrastructure to show the country’s progress, but neglect appropriate care when constructing and/or maintaining infrastructure components. The claim certainly has validity with the collision at Marşandiz, with the line being allowed to enter full operation without TDS in place in order to avoid delays. A modern rail line, a new station building, those things seem to have taken priority over actually finishing the construction/setup, not to mention the issue of placing a points guard on duty with a days old system he has never been trained on, if he even ever saw it before.
_______________________________________________________________
Starting with this installment the series will switch to a monthly schedule, releasing an article on the first sunday of each month. I couldn’t sustain the weekly schedule any longer, and, as announced back in Article #200, went with a stretched out schedule instead of irregular posts or a hiatus of undetermined length.
_______________________________________________________________
I have chosen to stay off Medium’s monetization offers to keep these stories as accessible as possible, but you can support me with a small tip via “Buy me a coffee” if you feel like it.
_______________________________________________________________
A kind reader is posting the installments on reddit for me, I cannot interact with you there but I will read the feedback and corrections. You can find the post right here.
