Background
Elsterwerda is a city of 7853 people (as of December 2019) in the east of Germany, located in the federal state of Brandenburg 80km/50mi east of Leipzig and 49km/30.5mi north of Dresden (both measurements in linear distance).
Elsterwerda lies on the Berlin-Dresden Railway, a double-track electrified main line connecting the two large cities on 174.2km/108mi of track. Opened in 1872, reduced to one track in the 1940s (the second track was shipped off as reparations after the war) and later returned to two-track configuration the railway is one of Germany’s most important railway lines and has been upgraded several times in recent years, now allowing top speeds of up to 200kph/124mph. At the time of the accident the top speed was set at 160kph/99mph. The line was used for everything from regional trains and freight traffic to international express trains to Budapest, Prague or Vienna.
The train involved
KC 71153 was a chartered freight train carrying diesel and gasoline from a refinery near Schwedt further north in Brandenburg via Berlin to a storage facility at Nossen in northern Saxony. By the time the train made it to Elsterwerda most of the trip would be done, with the destination being less than 50km/31mi linear distance away. The train consisted of 22 tank cars weighting a total of 1851 metric tons and was pulled by DB (German railway) 155 103 on the section of the journey taking it through Elsterwerda. The DB series 155 is a six-axle electric locomotive made in the GDR between 1977 and 1984 to pull heavy freight or express trains. The locomotives, whose boxy design got them nicknamed “Elektrocontainer” (“Electric container”) due to their similarity with a shipping container, weight 123 metric tons at 19.6m /64ft in length and can reach 125kph/78mph thanks to their six motors putting out a combined 5400kw/7241hp. By 1997 the surviving locomotives of the type had largely lost any passenger services, being exclusively used for freight trains (especially those carrying liquid chemicals or coal, ore and such materials. 2 years prior it had been decided that the type would get no major inspections anymore, starting the process of retiring the type in favor of the more modern series 145 and series 152.
The train had been taken to Berlin-Grünau by an unknown locomotive, which was disconnected from one end of the train while 155 103 was coupled to the opposite end to let the train reverse direction for the next part of the trip. 155 103 was scheduled to take the train to Riesa where it would be replaced with a diesel engine as the last leg of the route wasn’t electrified.
The accident
On the 20th of November at approximately 5:00am DB 155 103 is being coupled to the waiting row of tank cars at Berlin-Grünau. The train arrived with a delay, meaning the shunting worker has to work 3 trains at once as he assists the driver of 155 103 in preparing the train. The driver connected the couplers between the leading car and the locomotive, but, as the following events and later investigation showed, forgot to connect the pneumatic lines for the brakes, rendering the brakes inoperable. At this point the brakes were applied, meaning the train wasn’t going anywhere at this point even if the driver had tried departing. At this point normal procedure means the driver was to use the locomotive’s compressor to fill the entire pneumatic system with 5bar/72.5psi of air pressure. With the disconnected hoses and closed valves only the locomotive’s system filled up within a few seconds. The driver presumably didn’t notice that the system had reached the desired pressure much faster than it should take for a whole train to be pressurized. The shunting assistant was tasked with a so-called “simplified brake test”, as the train had not been split into several parts he only had to check if the brakes in the rear car could be applied and released, if the air lines were hooked up throughout the train and if all the valves were opened. The latter would be done by opening the rear valve on the rear car for 15 seconds and having the driver observe a drop in air pressure on the manometer in the driver’s cab.
The shunting worker did notice that the brakes on the rear car had not released as they should have been, something he blamed on an “overloaded system” caused by the previous locomotive charging the system with more than 5bar/72.5psi causing the new locomotive’s air pressure to be insufficient. At this point he should have notified the driver and changed protocol to a full examination of the brakes on every single car. Wanting to safe time and walking-distance he chose to manually release the brakes on each car individually “on the side” as he took care of the other two trains awaiting release, without examining the valves and hoses. With the locomotive disconnected from the train’s brake system this meant there now was no way to apply the brakes once the train started moving. The driver later testified that the shunting worker had given him the signal for a successful brake test, something the shunting worker denies doing. Which of the two men radioed the dispatcher saying the brake test was complete and the train was ready to depart could never be clarified. Neither could anyone explain why the shunting worker didn’t have the train stopped just as it started moving if he knew the brakes didn’t work. At a slow speed within the station the locomotive’s brakes might have sufficed in stopping the train. At approximately 5:30am KC 71153 left Berlin-Grünau station, dooming the train.
Because of the train’s delay it was decided that the locomotive-change to diesel traction would be done at Elsterwerda, with the diesel locomotive being directed to head towards the station to meet the freight train. While this happened KC 71153 moved through Brandenburg on level or slightly downhill tracks, having caught a window with little traffic meant there was no reason for the driver to apply the brakes along the way. As he approached Hohenleipisch (pronounced Ho-enleipish), a town 5km/3.1mi up the tracks from Elsterwerda, at 6:35am the driver was informed of the scheduled earlier stop. The signal box worker at Elsterwerda had set up a path to direct the train into track 5, off the main line, using points with a speed-limit for turning trains of 40kph/25mph. Coincidentally, Hohenleipisch also marked the start of a relatively steep downhill section towards Elsterwerda. Only now as he applied the brakes did the driver realize that there was no way his train would stop, especially not on a downhill track. The brakes of the locomotive just were no match for the momentum of the brake-less train pushing it downhill. At 6:45am a regional passenger train left Elsterwerda station, 2–3 minutes later KC 71153 reached the northern end of the station at approximately 90kph/56mph. The driver had alerted the dispatcher via radio of the defect, but it had been too late to do anything. Against any expectations the locomotive remained on the track, but it tore off the train and stopped 177m/581ft down the tracks. The leading fifteen tank cars derailed between the tracks with some falling over, moments after the train had reached the station a fire erupted around the wreckage of the train. The fire department, which had been alerted when the driver reported the brake failure, reached the station a few minutes after the train, arriving just as the first tank car’s emergency valves failed to keep up with the heat and the car blew up. The shockwave tore other cars open and ripped the roof off the station building, people later reported fuel raining down on them several hundred meters away (100m = 328ft). Cars driving down a road adjacent to the tracks were pushed into the other lane as they went along.
Aftermath
In the following minutes 4 more tank cars blew up one by one, aided by the fire department initially not knowing what was on fire and how to extinguish it. The shed of the local depot caught fire, the DB 155 069 parked there burned out. The city’s fire chief was killed when a burning bistro next to the station building collapsed in on itself and him, another severely injured firefighter would succumb to his injuries five days later. Seven firefighters suffered severe injuries, a police officer was treated for minor injuries. Even once the fire department knew what they were dealing with they had trouble fighting the blaze, running out of water in their own trucks and finding the hydrants to provide insufficient amounts. They also couldn’t approach the train in the initial hours, fearing more explosions from the train cars which were engulfed in fire. The sight is likened to the aftermath of a bombing in World War 2, with fire surrounding the firefighters, flames reaching higher into the sky with each explosion. One of the surviving firefighters later recalls his colleagues pulling him to safety as his boots get stuck in molten aspahlt, he is flown to the hospital and survives despite severe burns. It took until midday for a locomotive driver to be allowed to drive near the fire and pull away seven intact, non-derailed cars and thus limit the extend the fire may escalate to. Four more cars survived intact (as in, without leaking) closer to the fire, they were pumped dry once the fire was declared out. The fire department was fighting fires and heat-spots for more than 34 hours, involving 310 firefighters with 62 vehicles along with 14 ambulances and 2 helicopters taking care of the injured responders. The driver of the train actually escaped his locomotive, the fire and the smoke uninjured.
The severely damaged locomotive shed as well as the bistro were demolished and not rebuilt, the station building, which had only been opened after extensive reconstruction/refurbishments in 1992, was repaired along with the tracks and platforms. It takes over 10 years for the soil to be cleaned of the tons of fuel that seeped into it during the fire (some sources say 50 metric tons, other several hundred tons). The DB initially tries to blame the fire department for the extend of the damage, causing an outcry and quickly being shut down in court. It takes until November 2002 for a trial to start, with the shunting worker and the train driver being charged with negligent cause of bodily harm and negligent interference with rail traffic. The shunting worker is sentenced to 10 months on probation, the driver to six. Both also have to pay a fine of 500 Euros/600USD. The DB keeps fighting responsibility all the while, relatives and surviving responders along with people who suffered property damage are forced into a muddy legal battle. In the end Mister Petersen, the fireman whom his colleagues pulled from molten asphalt, is the only one to see it through and get a small, undisclosed amount of money. In interviews he expresses that the sum he got was not even worth the time spent getting it. He no longer works as a firefighter, scars and consequences from injuries to his feet and legs limit his mobility and flexibility, he also can’t push the traumatic images aside. On the day he was one of the first three men to approach the fire, the other two don’t survive. Five men he ordered to wait in the cover of a house survive with injuries when an explosion collapses part of the building. It’s generally agreed that the blaze could have been even worse had more cars exploded, especially if one thinks of the nearby residential area. Something like that happens later in Italy, the 2009 Viareggio Derailment sees a train carrying LPG derail and catch fire with the blaze reaching nearby residential streets. There, 32 people die.
DB 155 103 sees its minor damage repaired and returns to service, later being sold to a private rail service provider. Against the DB’s plans the series 155 is still in service today, about a dozen still run for the DB along with a handful more in private hands. Freight trains still run on the same line with the same cargo, regularly rattling through Elsterwerda station. Today only a small memorial-stone with a metal plaque tells passerby of what happened, complimenting the two men who died fighting the blaze. Then again, you can’t forget that the events of the day are still very present in the memories of those who witnessed it or were involved, so they probably don’t need more reminders. A few years after the accident the city, following relatives’ wishes, replaces the anual memorial service with one every ten years.
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