Thurbocharged Trouble: The 2013 Neuhausen Train Collision
Background
Neuhausen am Rheinfall (one of over 30 “Neuhausen” in Germany, Austria and Switzerland) is a town and municipality of 10512 people (as of December 2018) in the far north of Switzerland in the Canton Schaffhausen. The municipality, named after the local “Rheinfall” (Rhine River Falls), one of Europe’s biggest waterfalls by throughput, lies in a westbound hook-shaped part of Switzerland, meaning the closest border with Germany is to the south/southwest on the edge of the town of Neuhausen, just 2km/1.24mi from the site of the accident. Zürich, whose Canton of the same name begins in the middle of the Rhine River, is located 35km/21.75mi to the south and Konstanz (Germany) is located 41.5km/26mi to the east (all distances measured in linear distance).
The city is linked to the railway network by 3 passenger stations as well as a private freight yard by the IVF Hartmann Holding (a manufacturer of medical consumer goods). The station Neuhausen Bad BF in the western part of the town is one of the few Swiss train stations German trains can reach due to the track being electrified to the German rather than the Swiss standard. The southern station Neuhausen Rheinfall (opened in 2015) and the eastern station Neuhausen (acting as the town’s main station) right on the shore of the Rhine River are electrified to the Swiss standard and thus are not reachable by international trains. The stations lie on the Rheinfallbahn (Rheinfall Railway), a 29.92km/18.59mi mostly single-track electrified branch line opened 1857. Originally made to connect Zürich with Germany that purpose was fulfilled by a different railway line starting in 1897, since then the Rheinfallbahn mostly serves regional traffic as well as occasional freight traffic.
The trains involved
Both trains involved were part of the S-Bahn Zürich, a suburban/regional passenger service focused on connections within the Canton of Zürich with few connections into the neighboring Cantons and even southern Germany. Unusually for an S-Bahn the service is provided by different companies, the trains offer first and second class seating (instead of being all second class), and some of the network is comprised of narrow gauge (1000mm “Meter Gauge” in this case) railways. All in all the S-Bahn Zürich has a network of 380km/240mi with 171 stations and carries (as of 2017) 564 thousand passengers each day.
The northbound train, S33 from Winterthur (the H is ignored, the English th doesn’t exist in German) to Schaffhausen was provided by Thurbo (pronounced Turbo), an independent subsidiary of the SBB (Swiss national railway) and the Canton Thurgau. The name, which is often interpreted as symbolizing the quick trains, is actually a combination of Thurgau and Bodensee (Lake Constance), a lake split by Germany, Switzerland and Austria. On the day of the accident S33 was provided with one of the company’s 51 RABe 526, electric multiple units from Stadler Rail’s third generation GTW (“Gelenktriebwagen”, meaning articulated rail car) 2/6-family. Introduced in 2002 the third generation GTW 2/6 is a three-car six-axle electric multiple unit (a diesel version also exists, but is not used by Thurbo) measuring 39.5m/129ft in length while offering 106 seats in a two-class configuration. A unique feature of the GTW is that it doesn’t spread its powertrain through the entire train like similar modern trains, instead using a two-axle “power module” in the middle of the train while passengers occupy the two longer end cars. Some customers actually allow passengers to walk through the power car to the other passenger area, while some ban it. The power module has two driven axles, while the end cars have one two-axle bogie each at the far end by the driver’s cab, while the other end rests on the power module. The 2/6 part of the name refers to two out of 6 axles being powered. Inserting a center car turns the 2/6 into a four-car 2/8 for higher passenger capacity. Thurbo’s version of the 3-car GTW has an empty weight of 63 metric tons and can reach up to 140kph/87mph. On the day of the accident the S33 was a double-traction of two GTWs, with number 750 (named “Zürich Wine Country”) leading and number 775 (which was unnamed) following.
Coming the other way was S11 from Schaffhausen to Winterthur, provided by the SBB itself as a locomotive-pulled train. Running in a so-called sandwich-configuration the train consisted of SBB Re 420 230 HVZ at the front followed by six bilevel passenger cars and another Re 420 HVZ, number 216, pushing from the back of the train. The Re 420 HVZ (meaning “Hauptverkehrszeit”, German for Rush Hour) was created in 2011 when the SBB introduced the “Lion” modernization program to adapt 30 Re 420 four-axle electric locomotives for the S-Bahn to run modernized bilevel trains in sandwich configuration to help with peak passenger numbers. The locomotives can be easily identified by their 5 round LED headlights, the black-red paint job with the large SBB-logo on the side, rectangular buffers and a lack of chrome lettering down the sides. Like the normal Re 420 the HVZ-versions are 14.9m/49ft long and weight 80 metric tons while reaching up to 140kph/87mph. With new bilevel passenger cars moving into the main fleet some older cars (by 2013 over 20 years old) were no longer needed, so the SBB decided to refurbish those to be combined with the Re 420 HVZ. The refurbishment included new enclosed toilet-systems, new interior-materials (for both looks and fire-safety), a repaint and an interior on the lower level set up to enable use by wheelchair-bound passengers. As the HVZ-program included no control cars the trains require a second locomotive at the back of the train for return-trips if shunting work is to be avoided. Both locomotives are controlled from one cabin via a wire running the length of the train (permanently installed in the cars), and when it’s time to turn around the driver will exit one locomotive, run down the length of the train and enter the other.
The accident
On the 10th of January 2013 at approximately 7:30am S11 is approaching Neuhausen station from the north at 57kph/35.5mph, coming from nearby Schaffhausen with 200 passengers. Before reaching the station S11 will have to separate from the shore of the Rhine River, going into the (seen from S11’s cab) right hand track to get around the Thurbo GTW that is pulling into Neuhausen station from the south. For this, the GTW will be held at the station until S11 passed over a set of points 130m/426ft ahead of the platform (note that the oncoming train does not stop at the very end of the platform but further back). Meanwhile the GTW has slowed into the station and stopped. Usually drivers are instructed to move a directional switch (forward, standstill, reverse) into the central standstill position once the train has come to a stop. This locks the throttle-lever, securing it against, mainly, unintentional operation. For unknown reasons the 34 years old driver of the GTW on the day of the accident neglects to do this. He later states he stopped and then looked back down the side of his train (Swiss trains have rear-view mirrors) and watched passengers enter and leave the train. The Thurbo-trains run “unaccompanied”, meaning there is no conductor on board and the drivers oversee the passengers coming and going as well as operation of the doors. He does not remember why he forgot to use the directional switch. With the scheduled departure-time arriving and passengers having finished boarding the train the driver closes the doors and starts to pull away from the platform after 29 seconds at 7:33am with 80 passengers on board. It’s at that moment that he realizes he is accelerating towards a red main signal and was not cleared to depart yet. Already travelling at 56.3kph/34.9mph after 215m/705ft he triggers an emergency stop, 16m/52ft before the red signal, where an automatic stop would be initiated. Knowing he might not be able to avoid a collision he also turns the headlights of the train red, a warning-signal for the oncoming train. Seeing the GTW come towards him with red headlights the 55 years old driver of S11 also initiates an emergency stop and, hoping to maybe reach the points before the collision and avoid an impact at full width, retreats to the right side of his cabin. Seconds later, just as S11 has reached the points, the two trains collide. The GTW has almost come to a stop, rolling at 1.2kph/0.7mph it’s struck on its left hand side by the S11’s leading locomotive travelling at 37kph/23mph. The locomotive pushes the GTW back 21m/69ft as it derails on impact, protective structures and crumple-zones in the nose of the GTW deflect the heavy locomotive aside, it comes to a stop halfway off the track and leaning against the destroyed leading car of the GTW, having torn up several meters of the lighter train’s left hand wall.
Aftermath
The GTW doesn’t fall over as the locomotive pushes against it, withstanding such high forces that the track ends up buckling. S11’s locomotive pulled its leading car along as it derailed, while the locomotive itself ends up listing noticeably to the left the derailed car remains largely upright. Within minutes after the accident professional responders reach the site of the accident, within a short time 220 responders from Switzerland and nearby Germany are involved in the rescue effort. The damage especially to the GTW looks severe, but it’s soon clear that nobody has been killed in the accident. In fact, it’s assumed that some number of passengers just wandered off after the accident without reporting to responders. Eighteen people, including the driver of the GTW, are injured, 5 of the passengers suffer severe injuries. 9 people are taken to the hospital, all but one can go home before the day is over. The one passenger who has to stay longer is a 23 years old Swiss national who broke his hip during the collision and needed surgery. He later states in an interview that he’d been sitting in the forward-most row of the Thurbo-train, with his back to the driver. When the trains crashed he was thrown around the passenger area along with his seat.The driver of the GTW suffers minor injuries as his entire cabin (including the control desk and floor) is pushed up and to the side, he receives treatment as well as psychological support as part of the rescue effort before being allowed to go home. 2 hours after the accident the trains are empty and everyone who was on board is taken care of. The passengers from the forward bilevel car had to wait the longest, only after the torn overhead wires were confirmed to be shut off and grounded could they climb out of the train car. Employees from the SBB decide that the Re420 won’t fall over if the GTW is removed, and as such the trains are separated later in the day. The double-traction is separated, the rear train (with minor damage to its coupler from being shoved backwards) is towed away first. It could’ve most likely moved under its own power had the accident not damaged the overhead wires requiring power to remain cut. With the forward section stabilized and some loose debris removed the leading GTW is towed away a little later also. Investigators later praise the GTW’s structural integrity, despite being struck by a much faster and stiffer train almost 3.6 times its weight (588 vs 164 metric tons according to the report) the crash-structures worked, keeping most of the passenger-compartment intact and ensuring enough survival-space for the driver. The driver’s cab of the Re 420 suffered severe damage to its left hand side, largely caving in as the stiffer and heavier frame tore through the GTW. Moving to the right hand side of the cabin certainly saved the driver’s life.
Failing to find any technical fault with either train the investigators soon turn their attention to the drivers. The driver of the GTW soon admits to have realized that the signal was red as he departed the station. His train’s data-logger shows that he furthermore forgot to operate the directional switch, as it remained on forward the whole time he was stopped. A small indicator, a sign with an arrow that lights up when drivers are meant to move it from standstill to forward was apparently overlooked also. At the time of the accident the section of track the collision took place on was secured with Integra-Signum, a system that could auto-stop a train if it ran a red main signal or when a warning (red pre-signal, drastic speed limit reduction) wasn’t acknowledged by the driver. It could not keep a train from moving towards a red signal or limit a train’s speed. Some parts of Switzerland were instead secured with ZUB 121 (“Zugbeeinflussung”, German for “Train Influence System”), a more advanced safety-system that would not have allowed the GTW to depart the station under a red signal. Under those factors the train was simply too fast to stop in time by the time the driver realized his error, had he not realized it and instead only started to slow down when Integra-Signum would’ve kicked in upon passing the red signal the collision would’ve been even worse and might have happened directly head-on, before S11 started to move out of the way on the points. S11’s driver later pointed out the GTW’s excellent behavior once the chain of events had been set in motion, not falling into a panic but triggering the brakes and turning the headlights red. The latter warning allowed S11’s driver enough time to start to slow down and also to retreat to the other side of his driver’s cab, lessening the consequences of the collision.
While the driver of the GTW was mainly at fault for what happened the report also pointed out that the older, arguably outdated safety-system played a critical role in the collision. Had the station been equipped with ZUB 121 the GTW couldn’t have departed no matter what the driver does. There had been a couple of similar accidents or almost-collisions in the years before this collision, the report alone mentions three examples in the past 1.5 years. After the accident the SBB accelerated the process of upgrading all their routes to ZUB-systems. By 2017 all of the SBB’s are upgraded again to the new ETCS (European Train Control System), which permanently controls a train’s speed and the surrounding signals. After the accident the driver of the GTW was allowed to take an already-scheduled vacation, a spokesperson for Thurbo pointed out that in the company’s opinion he had not been criminally negligent and would be allowed to continue working with the company if he felt up to it after what happened. The Canton’s public prosecutor’s office started a criminal investigation against the driver, which presumably ended without a sentence as there’s no record of a sentence of even a trial taking place. Both trains involved in the accident were repaired after the accident and returned to regular service by 2014. Today nothing at the site points to what happened, and with upgrades in safety-equipment there can be no repetion of the collision.
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