Background
Kolbaskowo is a town of 520 people (as of 2013) in the far northwest of Poland, located 11km/7mi southwest of Szczecin and 2km/1.3mi east of the German border at Pomellen (both measurements in linear distance).
The town lies on the Berlin–Szczecin railway, a partially-electrified mostly single-tracked main line connecting the Polish metropolis with the German capital. The section west of the border is one of Germany’s oldest rail lines, opening in 1843 when the entire length of the line was on German (technically Prussian) soil. The line sees mostly cross-border regional services along with freight trains, with the occasional international express service in between at speeds of up to 160kph/99mph (German side) and 120kph/75mph (Polish side) respectively.
The Vehicles Involved
Kolbaskowo is the site of a gravel-pit on its northwestern outskirts (in fact, the pit itself is across the border in Germany), accessed via a long paved access road which merges into the district road just north of the town in immediate vicinity to a level crossing. Just before the accident a truck driver had picked up a load of gravel (the exact tonnage is unknown) from the pit and was intending to head south after reaching the access road. Like most of the countless trucks accessing the pit every day the vehicle consisted of a semi-truck with a two-axle dump truck trailer. Make/Model and measurements of the trailer are unknown, the truck used was a DAF CF 400 a two-axle multipurpose truck with the common cab-over design (meaning there was no long hood ahead of the windshield) measuring 6.85 metric tons at a length of 6.15m/20.2ft.
Dump-trailers similar to the one involved in the accident measure 8.6m/28.2ft in length at an empty weight of 4.7 metric tons and can carry 28.3 metric tons of cargo.
RMM 80681 is a regional passenger service from Szczecin Główny (Poland) to Berlin-Gesundbrunnen (Germany), provided on the day of the accident by a train consisting of 3 DB (German national railway) series 646. “Series 646” is the name given by the DB to first-generation Stadler GTW diesel multiple units, introduced in 1995. The GTW (“Gelenktriebwagen”, “Articulated Rail Car”) is a three-car multiple unit made by Stadler Rail in both electric and diesel-powered versions, specifically aimed at low acquisition- and operating-cost. The series 646 is the diesel-version of the first generation GTW and consists of two unpowered end-cars for passenger seating on either side of a distinct, short propulsion module. The series 646 is part of the “second batch” of the first generation, featuring a fiberglass cover on the driver’s cabs to provide a more elegant appearance. The full trains are generally referred to as series 646, while the end cars are actually numbered 946 and only the propulsion modules are designated 646. Each series 646 measures 38.66m/127ft in length at a weight of 55.6 metric tons empty and can reach 120kph/75mph. Depending on interior configuration the first generation GTW can carry up to 134 seated and 112 standing passengers. On the day of the accident three combined units of the type (triple-traction) made up the train, coming in at a combined 213 metric tons in weight at 117m/384ft in length. The train was led by 646 030, which had started service in November 2001.
The accident
On the 29th of July 2021 DB 646 030 and two of its siblings are heading southwest through Poland at 70kph/43.5mph, approaching the town of Kolbaskowo just up the road from the German border in the early morning hours. At 6:08am a semi-truck loaded with gravel leaves the gravel pit near the town and makes its way down the access-road, crossing into Poland as it approaches Kolbaskowo. He passes a large orange sign 150m/492ft ahead of the intersection, warning drivers of the level crossing in immediate vicinity of the access road’s intersection with the district road.
The district road itself crosses the rail line at an angle of 70°, using a barrier-less crossing which is equipped with signage and flashing red lights. Cars on the fully paved district road are allowed to go as fast as 90kph/56mph. The gravel pit’s access road, which features an extensive unpaved shoulder/edge, merges into the district road at nearly 90°, but only after vehicles on the access road navigate a left-right S-curve putting them parallel with the rail line right before merging into the district road. Merging also includes a 1.6m/5.2ft climb in height within a short distance.
As the truck driver approaches the crossing vegetation on either side of the access road temporarily blocks his view of the rail line, although there is an additional sign and set of lights installed right in his sightline. Once he merges onto the district road, 13m/43ft from the tracks, he will also be able to look down the rail line to his left again.
DB 646 030 comes out of a sprawling right hand turn by 6:14am, 1.4km/0.9mi from the crossing. Seconds later, the driver spots the bright silver truck move into his path. He triggers an emergency stop and sounds the horn, intending to warn the truck driver of the approaching train which he likely knew wouldn’t stop in time. The truck itself manages to clear the crossing at the last moment, but its trailer doesn’t. DB 646 030 hits the rear left side of the trailer at 6:15, still travelling at 62kph/38.5mph.
Truck and trailer are thrown off the crossing to the south, spinning around as their coupler breaks apart. The wheel assembly tears off the trailer in the process and becomes lodged below 946 530, the leading end car, as the train derails to the south as well. The leading GTW derails entirely, with the front car coming to a rest at nearly 90° to the rail line while the rear one remains almost aligned with the tracks. The second unit (646 014) suffers minor impact-damage from running into the unit in front and having its coupler rip off, but remains on track. The rear unit (646 029) is undamaged.
Both drivers and 7 passengers are injured in the collision, with only the drivers being briefly taken to hospital before being released the same day.
Aftermath
First responders reached the site within a few minutes, finding that the train driver, despite his injuries, had taken charge of the site and already successfully shut off and cleared the train. Firefighters secured some leaking fluids around the leading 646’s propulsion unit before, once police officers allowed them to do so, cleared spilled gravel off the railway line. By 9:05am the DB was allowed to remove their train from the site, responding by driving the rear two units back to Szczecin under their own power while the leading unit was split up and dragged off the tracks. The rail line was then repaired and reopened to traffic by midnight. The truck’s wreckage was hauled away on the day of the accident, while removing the stranded train apparently proved more difficult. Photos show the train, draped in police tape, still sit by the side of the tracks on September 1st 2021, with some wondering if it was meant to be left there as a warning to the truckers accessing the gravel pit. Others just wanted it gone, as it not only attracted tourists but also, to quote a newspaper, “vandals, scrappers and people who like high-alcohol drinks”.
With one unit severely damaged and two more units set aside for the investigation the DB faced a serious rolling stock shortage, not helped by a fourth unit of the type having been pulled from service a few weeks prior after hitting a fallen tree. And just like that accident, as the investigation soon figured out, this one was in no part the fault of the DB or their employee at the controls. The accident was the sole fault of the truck driver, who had driven into the level crossing despite lights flashing and a train approaching. The train driver had no chance to avoid the collision, doing what he could to at least lessen the consequences.
The investigation found that the truck driver was licensed to operate the truck, which itself had a valid technical inspection certificate and was in good working order, and had had 13 hours of rest ahead of starting his shift. During his interrogation by law enforcement the driver stated that he didn’t see the train or the level crossing lights due to the low-sitting sun, and by the time he heard the train horn he did attempt to speed up but couldn’t accelerate the heavy trailer fast enough to clear the crossing in time.
The investigation calculated the position of the sun on the day of the accident and timed similar settings in order to recreate the situation just ahead of the accident. Their experiment concluded that the sun had indeed been shining right in the truck driver’s face as he neared the end of the access road, temporarily concealing both the level crossing’s warning light and the installed mirror to show the left hand side of the district road.
The sun’s position relative to that of the truck driver is declared as a major factor in the accident, but there were contributing factors as well. The steep incline of the access road just ahead of the district road along with difficulty observing traffic on the district road can distract drivers regardless of sunlight, while truck drivers (who provide the majority of the traffic on the access road) may be focussed on quickly getting their heavy vehicles up the incline and into traffic. The investigators propose that the driver on the day of the accident may have been focused on looking left to spot any quickly approaching cars on the district road, while also having an understandable reason to try and keep moving during the merger instead of stopping on the incline. At the same time the sun both obstructed visibility of the rail line up ahead and eliminated the mirror meant to aid with spotting traffic approaching from the left.
The report goes on to list three more accidents between cars and trains at the level crossing in the prior years, one of which ended with a fatality when the struck SUV caught fire, killing the driver. One of these accidents also happened due to the driver being blinded by the sunlight, while another had a driver attempt to drive around what he thought was a truck parked on the side of the access road, not realizing that the truck was standing there to wait for a train to pass before merging. The third, fatal accident remains unresolved as the driver of the car perished in the accident. 4 comparable accidents within 10 years are declared enough to categorize the level crossing as especially dangerous, leading to a strong suggestion to install further signage on both the access road and district road. Furthermore, reducing train speeds ahead of any level crossing to no more than 60kph/37mph is suggested. The report closes on two further main recommendations, asking the Mayor of the municipality to have the access route rerouted to merge further away from the crossing, and recommending that the PKP (Polish state railway) initiates the process of raising the safety-category of the crossing, which would bring it into a category of crossings that are equipped with barriers which lower on the road ahead of a train approaching.
DB 646 030 is eventually hauled back to Germany, being stripped for parts before eventually getting scrapped in 2022. It was part of a small fleet converted for cross-border services, being equipped with Polish train control and stronger headlights. Despite the type’s age its crash-protection structures held up fine in the accident, keeping the heavy obstacle from breaching the driver’s survival cell. The type is still in service with the DB and a number of other railways in Europe, while Stadler since made 3 further generations of the GTW (each improving both safety and efficiency) before moving on to the “Wink” in 2021, which passes considerably higher crash protection demands. As of this article being written (June 2023) the Wink is only in service in the Netherlands, while the GTW continues to see service in various European countries as well as the USA.
Barrier-less level crossings remain an inherent safety-risk, with many railways being unwilling to foot the sometimes considerable bill to upgrade them with barriers. In the case of this accident it was argued that the road the crossing sits on was relatively low-traffic, somewhat brushing aside that a lot of the traffic were heavy semi-trucks.
In 2021 the PKP announced that the Polish section of the rail line will be electrified and upgraded to double-track configuration to match the German section, with work scheduled to be finished by 2025. In the process of that undertaking the line’s top speed will be raised to 160kph/99mph. Several level crossings will be replaced by over- or underpasses, but it’s unclear if the crossing at Kolbaskowo will be upgraded to barriers or replaced whole in the process, seeing how it will need replacing to accommodate two tracks anyway.
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