Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The 1975 Hamburg (Germany) Train Collision
Background
Hamburg is a city and federal state of 1.85 million people (as of December 2021) in the north of Germany, located 55km/34mi southwest of Lübeck and 96km/60mi northeast of Bremen (both measurements in linear distance) right on the Elbe River.
The city is home to the Hamburg Harbor Railway (“Hamburger Hafenbahn”), a network of over 300km/186mi of railway tracks (as of 2023) connecting the harbor to both the general German rail-infrastructure and the Maschen shunting yard (the world’s second largest such facility). The location of Hamburg’s harbor in the center of the city requires freight trains to and from it to cross through significant parts of the city.
The Hamburg Harbor Railway is connected to the Niederelbbahn (Lower Elbe Railway) at Hamburg-Hausbruch south of the Elbe river. The Lower Elbe Railway is a 103.6km/64mi double-tracked mostly electrified main line connecting Hamburg with Cuxhaven on the shore of the north sea along the southern bank of the Elbe River. Opening in sections between 1880 and 1882 the line is mostly used for regional passenger services at speeds of up to 140kph/87mph, with freight trains being mostly limited to the immediate vicinity of Hamburg as well as Cuxhaven.
The trains involved
Sg 52323 was a freight train from Hamburg-Waltershof to Maschen shunting yard consisting of an unknown number of container-carrying freight cars pulled by a DB (German national railway) series 212. The series 212 is a four-axle multipurpose diesel locomotive introduced as the V100 in 1958, being developed mainly as a way to retire steam locomotives from branch lines. The series 212 was originally designated as the V100.20, a higher-power version of the original V100. Each series 212 measures 12.3m/40ft in length at a weight of 63 metric tons. The locomotives have a power output of 993kW/1332hp from a V12 diesel engine and can reach 100kph/62mph.
N6858 was a regional passenger service from Hamburg main station to Buxtehude, carrying mostly workers heading to their homes in the suburbs of Hamburg. Pulling the train was a DB series 141. Introduced in 1956 as the E41 and renumbered in 1968 the series 141 is a four-axle electric locomotive developed for regional and branch line passenger services. The type was developed as part of the DB’s standardization-program, which saw a number of different locomotives being developed on a shared platform with changes depending on individual purposes. This was to allow a quick electrification after WW2 by having the different types share as many parts as possible. Coming in at 66.4 metric tons made the series 141 the lightest member of the standardized electric locomotive family. Each series 141 measures 15.62m/51ft in length and can reach 120kph/75mph with a power-output of up to 3700kW/4961hp.
On the day of the accident the regional train consisted of six Type-n passenger cars, a four-axle passenger car for regional services introduced in 1959. The type is nicknamed “Silberling” (“Silverling”) due to their unpainted stainless steel exterior with a Perlée cover supposedly being reminiscent of silver coins. Each Type-n car measures 26.4m/86.6ft in length while empty weight ranges from 31 to 40 metric tons depending on the configuration. Top speed varies slightly as well, ranging from 120–140kph/75–87mph. Single-class second class cars have the highest capacity at 96 seats.
The accident
On the 22nd of July 1975 train number N6858 was a regional passenger service taking workers from Hamburg’s downtown area and industrial zones to the southwestern suburbs around Buxtehude. At the time of the Hamburg-Harburg, located south of the Elbe, was not only a regional hub for train traffic but also home to the former Tempo-factory (a defunct manufacturer of delivery vans), which by 1975 was owned by Mercedes and used for production of the “Harburger Transporter”, a delivery van Mercedes “grandfathered in” when they took over the factory. The factory had its own train station on the Lower Elbe Railway west of Harburg station, named “Hamburg-Tempowerk” (“Hamburg Tempo Factory”).
Due to the close proximity between stations in the area, plus the intersection with the Harbor Railway, the main signal for westbound trains ahead of the intersection was located past the factory’s station, while the pre-signal was located ahead of it. At approximately 5:05pm N6858 passed the pre-signal, which showed “expect stop”, with the driver Mister Schröter confirming having seen the signal by pushing a button in the driver’s cab before pulling into Hamburg-Tempowerk station. At the same time Sg 52323 was heading southeast after picking up containers at Waltershof’s harbor-terminal, planning to head to Maschen shunting yard to the southeast of Hamburg. Joining the Lower Elbe Railway required the freight train to cross the “oncoming” westbound tracks. The dispatcher on duty planned for the regional train to hold at a red signal ahead of the intersection, just past Hamburg-Tempowerk station, to allow the freight train to cross into the eastbound tracks.
N6858 took on further passengers at the factory’s station, the exact number is unknown but it can be assumed that the train was fairly crowded. Loading and unloading of passengers was finished by 5:10pm, with Mister Schröter being cleared to depart and pulling away from the platform, continuously picking up speed instead of slowly pulling up to the main signal a short distance down the tracks. Usually the train would have proceeded directly to Hamburg-Hausbruch station, as the oncoming freight train was a common but not a regular service. It wasn’t part of the routine pattern of stops on the westbound line, so Mister Schröter, following that routine pattern, had simply forgotten that this time the pre-signal had told him to expect a stop.
He later recalled spotting the red signal just ahead of the Autobahn-overpass, realizing his mistake in an instant. By that point the train was already travelling at approximately 80kph/49.5mph. He triggered an emergency stop before, realizing he wasn’t losing speed fast enough, he threw himself on the floor of the cab and braced for the impact. His coworker aboard the freight train, after also triggering an emergency stop, chose to jump from his train instead. The freight train was driving eastbound at 30kph/18.6mph when, at 5:12am, it collided head-on with the regional train, which was still moving at approximately 40kph/25mph. The back of the series 212 was lifted up on impact, causing most of the crush-damage to the forward driver’s cab of the electric locomotive to be located above the driver’s desk. Mister Schröter, lying flat on the ground, survived with minor injuries.
Behind him the weight of five loaded Type-n cars forced the leading car into the back of the locomotive with such immense force that the front end mounted the frame of the locomotive, crushing the rear cab and ending up 7m/23ft above the ground. The forward area including the forward doors was completely destroyed in the process, leaving no chance of survival for the passengers seated there. 11 passengers died in the collision, with 125 being injured, 65 of which severely. The freight train’s driver was among the survivors, managing to miss any trackside obstacles as he jumped from his train.
Aftermath
Local residents alert emergency services moments after the accident, with the first responders arriving within a few minutes. Witnesses describe a horrific sight, with blood dripping from the leading train car and trapped survivors being heard inside, several meters above the ground. Firefighters stabilize the wreckage of the forward passenger car while ambulance crews and local residents take care of the survivors from the rest of the train. It is originally assumed that Mister Schröter has died in the collision, likely leading to some surprise when he’s pulled from the wreckage with little more than some scrapes and bruises.
Firefighters eventually access the crushed end of the leading passenger car from below, using spreaders and cutting-tools to enlarge the former passageway which is now pointing downwards. Cutting the train car apart bit by bit allows them to recover the victims over the course of the night, it was fairly obvious early on that nobody in that section had had a chance to survive. The train car’s forward section suffered a near-total loss of survival space as it made its way up the back of the locomotive, ending up folded approximately 90° downward.
The cause of the accident is quickly narrowed down to human error, any safety-systems that were in place had been working fine. The fact that the passenger train managed to shed half its speed ahead of the impact also means brake-failure can be ruled out as the cause of the accident. In the days following the accident the DB has to face fierce criticism from the public and its employees alike, especially when it comes to light that the exact same situation had occurred almost exactly 4 years prior, except that time, by pure luck, the trains had come to a stop a few feet apart.
Adding insult to injury is the Warngau train collision in Bavaria the prior month (which was previously featured on this blog), where two regional trains had collided, claiming 41 lives. There, a technique called the “Luftkreuzung” (“Floating Crossing”) had been used (and failed), which consisted, on paper, of trains being meant to pass one another between the stations on single-track lines. Since this was obviously impossible the dispatcher at the station at one end of the track-section was supposed to talk to his colleague at the other end, deciding who would hold “his” train and whose train would get the right of way. At Warngau, the two dispatchers had misunderstood each other, leading to both thinking the other one would have his side’s train wait.
After the accident at Warngau the technique was declared wildly unsafe, being compared to something found in the age of horse-drawn trains, not modern rail traffic in the 1970s. Hamburg’s railway direction, quietly ignoring that they had used the technique as well, joined in the criticism, pointing out how three directions in southern Germany used that system along with other outdated safety-measures, while northern Germany had more modern and thus safer rail infrastructure, including many rail lines being double-tracked (or more).
Further making things worse were complaints by drivers who, even by the time of the near-accident four years prior, had pointed out that the main signal run by N6858 was quite hard to see. By 1975 it was still a semaphore signal, using a moving shield instead of colored lights. Being placed right up against a dark gray overpass made it difficult to read especially if it got dirty. Drivers had also pointed out how there should be a pre-signal repeater located at the western end of Hamburg-Tempowerk station, which would not only remind drivers of the signal-setting but also had the ability to trigger an emergency stop if it was disregarded.
The DB had reacted by mounting a white wooden board between the main signal and the overpass, meaning to contrast it against the concrete. Unfortunately dirt and grime from the trains and their exhaust-gasses soon grayed the white board, making it barely distinguishable from its backdrop.
In the end the situation remained that Mister Schröter had disregarded a red signal, even if it was by forgetting it between the pre-signal and main signal rather than being distracted or wilfully negligent. It still takes until 1.5 years after the accident for a trial to begin. Mister Schröter ends up being sentenced to 8 months of probation for negligent manslaughter in 11 cases and negligent cause of bodily harm in 65 cases. It’s likely that the court considered the DB’s unwillingness to improve safety at the site in the four years after an almost-collision had shown the flaws as a mitigating factor, as well as Mister Schröter trying to stop the train when he realized his fatal mistake.
Since the accident the main signal has been replaced by a modern light-signal, making it easier to read. Passenger services on the line have also reduced drastically, especially when a third track was installed which keeps the S-Bahn (urban and suburban commuter trains) separate from regular trains. Hamburg-Tempowerk station was removed in the mid-1980s, removing the interruption between pre- and main signal.
The DB retired the series 212 by 2005, reactivating a handful of them for maintenance- and construction-trains after being modernized. Another few units can be found operating in private hands, mostly for private construction companies or museum railways. The series 141 barely outlived it, seeing its last regular services in 2006. The locomotive has developed a small fandom among enthusiasts, helping to preserve 11 units (as of 2023), although most are not in operational condition. A handful of Type-n passenger cars are also still in operation, having been refurbished and repainted several times since the 1970s.
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A kind reader has started posting the installments on reddit for me, I cannot interact with you there but I will read the feedback and corrections. You can find the post right here.
