Multinational Mishap: The 2006 Zoufftgen (France) Train Collision
Background
Zoufftgen is a municipality of 1253 people (as of 2020) in the far north of France, located right on the border with Luxembourg 40.5km/25mi north of Metz (France) and 5km/3mi south of Bettembourg in Luxemburg (both measurements in linear distance).
While the town of Zoufftgen doesn’t have a train station it still lies on the Metz-Luxembourg railway, an international double- to quad-tracked electrified main line connecting France and Luxembourg. The line opened in sections between 1854 and 1859 and is used for everything from regional passenger services and freight trains to TGV high-speed trains, although speeds are limited to 160kph/99mph. Services are offered by both the CFL (Luxembourg’s national railway) and the SNCF (French national railway).
The trains involved
Train number 45938 was an international mixed freight service from Basel (Switzerland) to Bettembourg (Luxemburg) consisting of 22 freight cars of different kinds pulled by SNCF BB 37007. The SNCF series BB 3700 is a four-axle multisystem electric locomotive introduced by Alstom in 2004 as part of their “Prima”-family, intended specifically for cross-border freight trains. SNCF runs the locomotives as the 43700, with the 4 ahead of the number referring to the freight-department. Each series 3700 measures 19.52m/64ft in length at a weight of 89 metric tons and can reach up to 140kph/87mph. The driver, who was the sole person on board, had taken over the train minutes before the accident.
TER 837617 was a regional passenger service from Luxembourg (Luxembourg) to Nancy (France) provided by CFL Z2207. The series Z2200 is a three-car bilevel electric multiple unit (EMU) made by Alstom and introduced into service in Luxembourg in 2004. The same type, called Coradia Duplex by Alstom, is also in service as two to five car long versions with other railways. Each three-car unit measures 81.1m/266ft in length at an empty weight of 193 metric tons. The configuration in use by the CFL can reach a top speed of 160kph/99mph while carrying up to 339 seated passengers in a two-class configuration.
The accident
Cross-border rail lines always play a special role in railway infrastructure and operation, requiring a compromise between two countries’ systems not only on the technical side but also regarding operations and regulations. The site of the accident lies in a crossover-zone between luxembourgian rail infrastructure (owned by the CFL) and french rail infrastructure (owned by the RFF). Since the two countries’ guidelines cannot apply at the same time the section of track crossing the border was subjected to the “Consigne Frontaliere”, a special reglement for railway operations across the border. The entire line is fitted with the French train protection system (BAL), keeping trains at a safe distance from one another, and also special opposite-motion-protection (IPCS) allowing trains to use either track in the “wrong” direction compared to standard operation while still using trackside signals and keeping them secure.
Usually the western track, labelled Track 1, was used for southbound services while the eastern track (Track 2) was used for northbound services. On the day of the accident workers were replacing ballast and sleepers on Track 2, leaving the western track 1 for trains in both directions. This meant any northbound train, such as the freight train, was technically going in the wrong direction.
On the 11th of October 2006 TER 837617 is departing southbound from a red signal at 11:42am, 1869m/1.16mi north of the French border. The train carries just 15 passengers along with a driver working for the CFL and a conductor working for the SNCF. Signals instruct the driver to obey a 90kph/56mph speed limit due to the ongoing construction work at the border, he thus accelerates the train to 82kph as he approaches France.
At the same time the freight train is approaching the border from the south, having crossed into the left hand track at a set of points 15km/9.3mi ahead of the border. The freight train is travelling at 89kph/55.3mph as the first signal for Luxembourg (see photo above) comes into view. The locomotive is 124m/407ft from the border when the TER comes around the bend on the same track. Both drivers trigger an emergency stop as they spot one another, but it’s way too late to avoid the disaster. The trains collide head-on at 11:45am, travelling at 79kph/49mph each. The freight train crushes the TER’s driver’s cab as it mounts the frame of the EMU’s leading car, mowing through the car for a significant distance before getting stuck. Several freight cars derail, two are thrown in the air by the forces of the collision and land on top of the EMU’s middle car, collapsing the upper deck. Both drivers are killed in the collision, along with a construction worker and 3 passengers of the TER. 16 people survive with injuries.
Aftermath
The first calls to emergency services are placed at 11:45am, seconds after the collision. Trains from two countries being involved and part of the passenger train being in Luxembourg after the accident turns the accident into an international affair. Some of the calls come from trackside construction workers, allowing precise localization of the remote site. The conductor aboard the TER contacts the local signal box at 12:03pm, by which time the first responders reach the site. Within the hour over 100 police officers, 150 firefighters, several ambulance crews and seven accident recovery crews are involved in the rescue effort, along with a small fleet of rescue helicopters.
The site presents a sight of pure mayhem. More than half of the EMU’s leading car ceased to exist, freight cars along with their spilled cargo are scattered all over the place and debris covers the wreckage as well as the surrounding area. It’s immediately clear that neither driver, both of which remained in their seat until impact, stood a chance. The fact that the TER was next to empty, especially the leading car, does mean that there are far less victims to recover than initially feared.
It took until two days after the accident before the last victim could be recovered from the wreckage, leading to the state of emergency being called off. Investigators noted that anti-climb structures at the end of each of the EMU’s cars had worked as intended, “locking” the cars together and keeping them from mounting each other’s frame. This kept the rear two cars of the EMU largely intact throughout the accident, meaning no survival space inside them was compromised aside from a section of the upper deck which was crushed by two freight cars (approximately 25 metric tons each, plus cargo) landing on top of it. Additional frame-damage (the entire car had essentially bent down in the middle) meant it was a write-off regardless.
Both the freight train’s locomotive (built in 2004) and the EMU (2005) were fairly new and fulfilled the highest crash-safety ratings available at the time. Yet still the locomotive had lost both driver’s cabs, one from hitting the EMU and one from being rear-ended by its own train, and the leading car of the EMU had suffered a catastrophic loss of survival space, going from a length of 27.35m/89.7ft to just 7.6m/24.9ft. Reviewing the crash-safety requirements showed that the cab of the EMU was designed to withstand 4MJ (Megajoule) of impact force head-on. The accident, according to calculations, had exposed it to approximately 120MJ. In light of those findings it’s fairly understandable why the integrated safety-cell for the driver failed to preserve sufficient survival space.
The question that remains is why the trains ended up on a fatal collision course. Routing trains through the oncoming track is a standard procedure, especially on routes with systems like IPCS in place. Furthermore, both trains were in perfect working order and carried the necessary signaling-systems for the line. Originally suspicion falls on the freight train’s driver, he was travelling on the oncoming track, so maybe he crossed over into it without permission or departed a station early. But the train control system aboard the locomotive was functioning as intended, as far as investigators can tell, so running a red signal would have brought the train to a stop well ahead of the site of the accident.
Tracing the path of either train ahead of the accident suspicion instead falls on the main dispatcher at Bettembourg (Luxemburg), who was handling the operations on the luxembourgian side of the border. He had decided to clear the TER past a red signal, allowing it to head for the border despite the signaling-system not reporting a clear path. Instead he should have held the train at the signal, allowing the freight train to use the southbound track to head northbound into Luxembourg first. By the time the freight train approached the border it had accumulated a significant delay, usually it would have arrived in Luxembourg well before the TER reached the site of the accident.
Standard procedure would have had the luxembourgian signal box crew stop the TER ahead of the cross-border section to contact the signal box at Thionville (France) and ask if the path was clear to have the TER move past the red signal. Instead, likely assuming that the freight train had come through earlier (but not bothering to confirm this assumption), the main dispatcher passed a written note to a coworker instructing him to override the red signal right away. He realized his mistake a few moments after the TER was dispatched and triggered an alarm through the radio system, but the signal failed to reach the train for unknown reasons. He then cut power to the rail line, stopping an unrelated train nearby on open track, but the TER had already passed into the French part of the line’s electric supply system, putting it beyond the signal box’ control. Moments later, the two trains collided.
The main dispatcher and three of his coworkers were eventually found to be at significant fault regarding the accident, and were put on trial on charges surrounding negligent manslaughter and dangerous interference with rail traffic. The main dispatcher was sentenced to 3 years and 10 months in jail in January 2009, with a chance of early release on probation after 22 months. The coworker whom he had passed the note to and who overrode the red signal was sentenced to 3 years and 10 months in jail, while a points guard and dispatch-assistant received suspended sentences of 12 and 6 months respectively.
The CFL announced improvements to the operational safety had been implemented after the accident, in the form of a direct telephone-line between the signal boxes on either side of the border allowing immediate communication between dispatchers in Luxembourg and France. This, they claimed, would allow French dispatchers a chance to stop erroneously dispatched incoming trains from Luxembourg and vice-versa.
The leading car of the EMU, the freight train’s locomotive and eight freight cars were broken up for scrap at the site, while the EMU’s middle and rear cars were towed back to a maintenance facility in Luxembourg. The middle car was deemed beyond repair and stripped for parts before being scrapped while the rear car was used to assemble a new three-car unit which runs as CFL 2223.
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