Background
Neuwied is a city of 64860 people (as of December 2020) in the far west of Germany, located in the federal state of Rhineland-Palatine 44km/27mi south-southeast of Bonn and 90km/56mi northwest of Frankfurt (both measurements in linear distance).
Neuwied has both a passenger station and a freight yard on the East Rhine Railway (Rechte Rheinstrecke), a 179km/111mi double-tracked electrified main line connecting Cologne in the northwest with Wiesbaden to the southeast. Constructed in sections and finally connected in 1871 the line is nowadays mostly used for long-distance freight services while passenger trains use the West Rhine Railway (Linke Rheinstrecke, another railway on the other side of the river) or the new high speed line from Cologne to Frankfurt.
The train involved
KT 51315 was a mixed freight train from Gremberg to Mannheim’s shunting yard provided by DB Schenker Rail, the German railway’s freight division at the time. The train consisted of 39 freight cars for different kinds of cargo, including new cars as well as different liquids. Car number 37 was a tanker car of unknown specifications carrying an (in the report undefined) type of hazardous cargo (likely fuel or oil). Cars 35 and 36 were a pair of type Laaers car haulers, two-axle bilevel freight cars used to transport new cars. These cars always run in pairs with a special short-distance coupler between them. Each pair measures 30.4m/100ft in length and weights 34.7 metric tons empty. At the time of the accident the pair’s weight including cargo was listed at 54.58 metric tons. The car haulers have a top speed of 120kph/75mph which evidently wasn’t breached before the accident.
On the day of the accident the pair in the train, owned by STVA, a french rail cargo provider, carried 11 new cars for Opel, a German car-manufacturer. The cars, minivans of the model Opel Zafira (sold as Vauxhalls or Chevrolets in some markets, were on their way from the factory to France.
The accident
On the 18th of October at around 2:10pm KT 51315 is approaching Neuwied from the northwest, planning to pass right through and continue south across the Rhine river. It’s an uneventful trip so far, just like any other freight train using the line that day. At approximately 2:15pm the driver is radioed by the dispatcher at Neuwied station, very suddenly putting an end to the calm routine. The driver of an oncoming train has spotted flames on the car-haulers towards the back of the freight train. The dispatcher, quickly calculating the train’s position and braking-distance, chooses to not trigger an emergency stop right away, as he doesn’t want the burning freight train to come to a stop at the platform of the passenger station. The driver triggers an emergency stop after being notified by the dispatcher, aiming to stop just beyond the freight yard in a relatively safe, accessible place without needlessly endangering lives.
The delay-tactic works, with the freight train grinding to a stop 200m/656ft past the exit-signal of the freight yard at 2:31pm. It took the heavy freight train 320m/1050ft to stop from 60kph/37mph. By the time the train comes to a stop a shunting locomotive driver working at the yard is already expecting it, having been sent by the dispatcher to meet the train with a fire extinguisher. The shunting worker finds two already rather extensive fires in the forward section and the middle of the pair of car-haulers, several of the loaded cars are beyond saving at this point. Frankly, his handheld extinguisher won’t do any good. With permission from the dispatcher he disconnects the tanker car from the car hauler and the driver is told to pull the train forwards 2–3 car-lengths to keep the hazardous cargo save from the fire. Meanwhile the dispatcher shuts down traffic in and out of the eastern end of the freight yard and notifies the fire department, who arrive shortly after the train stopped. The firefighters can’t save any of the loaded cars, however they do manage to keep the fire from spreading to the train cars in front or the grass and brush next to the track. No-one is injured, but the car-haulers, new cars and part of the railway infrastructure are destroyed. In total the financial damage (not including delays/cancelled trains) is listed at 250 thousand Euros/293 thousand USD, more than half of which are the new cars.
Aftermath
The fire department manages to finally extinguish the last flames by 4:15pm, handing the site over to the investigators. By that time they’ve already talked to the shunting worker who assembled the train. He didn’t notice anything wrong, the cars rolled in fine and the brake-test gave no worries either. The damage to the cars clearly indicated that the fire started below the cars on the lower level, at the leading end of each half of the pair. The driver of the train doesn’t recall seeing anything suspicious along the way, like unauthorized people getting close to the train (who could start a fire purposely). The type of car-hauler used features large fences on the lower level meant to restrict access to the loaded cars (and protect them from debris), but this alone doesn’t completely rule out arson. However, the fact that no trace of any accelerant or similar trace of arson is found does largely rule it out.
30km/18.5mi ahead of Neuwied the train passed a special detection-system meant to spot stuck brakes or overheated wheel bearings on passing trains. The sensors measuring the bearings did report a temperature-difference of more than 20°C/68°F on the third axle (leading axle second half), but even the high temperature was below the 100°C/212°F mark that triggers an alarm. Similarly, the sensors for the brakes measured a difference of more than 100°C/212°F among the axles of the pair of cars but would only report a “hot” brake at 300°C/572°F and a “stuck”/”hot” one at 400°C/752°F. The highest value measured on the brakes was actually on the fourth (rear) axle of the pair, listing 211°C/412°C. But neither the difference in temperature between the bearings nor the more than 100°C/212°F difference between different axles’ brakes caused an alarm from the computer-system, and neither did the fact that brake-temperatures on the car haulers were significantly higher than those of the other cars on the train. The investigation brought in experts from the Dekra (the largest German technical inspection company) to closer inspect the charred train cars and give their opinion on the evidence at hand. The investigators agreed that the fire had originated from a technical defect on the first and third axle, independently. On both axles faulty brakes pressing onto the surface of the wheel had failed to fully release, but released enough to not be notable during the pre-departure checks or to make a notable difference to the driving feel. As the train went along the brakes and wheel got hotter and hotter, which also heated up the surface the cars on the lower level were parked on, only a few centimeters from the top of the wheel. Eventually, the surface the leading car of each half of the pair was parked on got so hot that the tires reached their flash point. They caught fire, subsequently setting fire to the cars. The train cars themselves hadn’t been on fire, but due to their bilevel construction their cargo being on fire was enough to destroy them also.
Cars in transit only get just enough fuel to make it on and off the train, had this been, for example, a car-hauler as part of a train with tourists with each car carrying a full tank of fuel (over 50l/13gal in the case of the Zafira) the fire could have been much worse. Similarly, the shunting worker’s ability to quickly detach the tanker car from the burning car haulers helped reduce the severity of the outcome.
The exact cause of the faulty brake system couldn’t be identified as too much of the system had been destroyed by heat and fire, but by eliminating unlikely or impossible causes and examining what was left of the train car the investigation still narrowed it down. In the end the fire was blamed on faulty valves in the pneumatic lines controlling the brakes, which was traced back to poor or negligent maintenance. The final report notes that the car haulers were in poor condition regarding maintenance despite their documentation showing the last inspection having taken place only two months ago. Among other things some of the brake pads had been installed too loosely while others were installed too tightly to work properly. In the end DB Schenker notified STVA of the investigation’s result and urged them to reassess their maintenance and inspection routines, which is really all they could do.
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