Family Affairs: The 1994 Bad Bramstedt (Germany) Train Collision
NOTE: This article deals with a possible suicide. If you or anyone you know is struggling with suicidal thoughts, do not hesitate to seek help. You can find your country’s resources for discreet help under this link: https://blog.opencounseling.com/suicide-hotlines/
Background
Bad Bramstedt is a city of 15331 people (as of 2022) in the far north of Germany, located in the federal state of Schleswig Holstein 42km/26mi north of Hamburg and 51km/31.5mi west of Lübeck (both measurements in linear distance).
The city lies on the Hamburg-Altona-Neumünster rail line, an unelectrified, partially double-tracked branch line operated by the AKN Eisenbahn GmbH (usually referred to as the AKN), a regional rail service provider owned by the federal state of Schleswig Holstein and the city of Hamburg. Opening in 1884 before being expanded to its full length by 1916 the line is mostly used for regional and commuter rail services, with occasional freight trains in between, especially when the nearby main line is closed. At the time of the accident traffic on single-track sections was arranged via onboard radio, with drivers required to contact the “direct traffic controller” who would then tell the drivers to either wait for an oncoming train or depart the station.
The Trains Involved
Both trains involved in the accident were the AKN’s standard diesel multiple unit in service at the time, referred to as the VT 2. The type, introduced into service in 1976 as the LHB VT 2E, consisted of two-car units measuring 30.13m/99ft in length at an empty weight of 51.9 tons. To enable the quick acceleration required for commuter rail services with frequent stops the units were fitted with two MAN diesel engines each, producing 228kW/306hp each while powering a generator which provides electricity for the wheels. Each two-car unit offers seating for 88 passengers at speeds of up to 88kph/55mph and is intended for single-man operation with no conductor riding on the train. Depending on demand up to 4 two-car units could run as a train, controlled from the leading driver’s cab. On the day of the accident each train carried around 45 passengers, with the oddity that the driver of the southbound service from Neumünster to Hamburg (provided by VT 2.31) had his 14 years old daughter ride along in the cab.
The Accident
On the 29th of September 1994 AKN VT 2.42 is providing a northbound rail service from Hamburg to Neumünster, running under the command of Mister P., an experienced driver who has been with the AKN for over a decade. The train is meant to hold at Bad Bramstedt station to let the oncoming service, provided by VT 2.31, pass before proceeding northwards. Logically, this means that when VT 2.31’s driver radioed the traffic controller at approximately 3:15pm he was cleared to proceed through the single-track section to Bad Bramstedt station. Instead, Mister P. sets his train in motion at 3:22pm without radioing for permission, accelerating out of the station to the north, into the single track section.
The short two-car train navigates a 90° right-hand turn before picking up speed on a short straight section, driving atop a near-vertical embankment as it gets to 60kph/37mph. A moment later it dives into a left hand turn in a wooded area, right as VT 2.31 enters the same turn from the north. The drivers barely have enough time to spot the other train before the trains collide at 3:24pm, sending a loud crash echoing over the nearby city. The consequences of the impact are disastrous, seeing the drivers cabs obliterated while the body of each leading car gets compressed and crumpled up past the forward doors. Both drivers, the southbound driver’s daughter and another 3 passengers are killed in the collision, another 80 are injured, 20 of which severely.
Aftermath
A resident who lives a few feet from the rail line places the first call to emergency services, which alerts the local volunteer fire department. The initial information is “train accident Bimöhler Straße 76” with no further information, leading the firefighters to suspect that an AKN-train once again hit a fallen tree, or maybe a car at the nearby rural level crossing. The first firetruck arrives on site 11 minutes after being alerted, with the unit’s leader recognizing immediately that they are WAY out of their depth with the half-dozen vehicles and few dozen men their volunteer department can provide. His input has the alarm raised to a catastrophic level, alerting professional and volunteer fire departments from several surrounding cities as well as the THW (Germany’s federal agency for technical relief). Within the hour 30 ambulances, several helicopters and over 300 responders are involved in the rescue and recovery-effort. It’s the area’s largest emergency response since the end of World War 2.
The last survivor is pulled from the wreckage at 7:00pm, taking 3 hours to be freed as he had been trapped with several limbs separately and required medical attention in between responders, as the fire department put it, “peeling back” the wreckage around him. He’s followed by the last victim being recovered an hour later, allowing the site to be handed over to the police.
The two trains are dragged back to Bad Bramstedt station the following day, allowing operations on the line to restart while investigators continue to examine the trains. There was no technical defect on either train, brakes, motors and radio systems worked as intended as far as the investigators can tell. Both drivers had plenty of experience too, so it’s deemed unlikely that either got overwhelmed or confused. Briefly, distraction of the southbound train’s driver by his daughter is considered, perhaps her talking to her father distracted him and caused him to depart without permission, but this theory is rejected when radio protocols and the statement by the traffic controller reveal perfect adherence to procedures despite having a passenger in the cab. This only leaves Mister P. at fault, with no other valid explanation for the accident than him departing unpermitted as unusual as that seems for an experienced driver. However, with him clearly at fault and deceased, the public prosecutor’s office decides that their job is done. The accident is chalked up to “human error/negligence” by the driver of the northbound train and that’s the end of it, at least for the time being.
Instead, public focus shifts elsewhere. Why was there no system in place to avoid the accident regardless of driver input? Why was a high frequency commuter rail system operating on verbal agreements and optimistic trust? As it turns out, it wasn’t. Not entirely at least. The AKN actually was in the middle of investing into a modernization of the rail line, which included signaling and automatic train control that would force any train to stop if it ran a red signal. The componentry for the system had actually already been installed on the trains and on part of the rail line. It was yet to be installed on the section north of Bad Bramstedt station, though. It would have just taken a few more weeks, maybe months, and the accident could not have taken place. A preventative measure meant to increase safety started in time but finished too late to prevent the accident it was meant to prevent. So in the end, what remained? In summary, outdated safety standards enabling a fatal accident caused by a random error which is out of character for the person committing it. It is here that we have to look back at Mister P., and especially at his past.
It was Miss Haverkamp, kinda-sorta stepdaughter to Mister P., who shed a light on the driver’s backstory which brought a completely new perspective. In her eyes, Mister P. likely caused the crash on purpose.
Miss Haverkamp gave an interview in 2014, on the accident 20th anniversary, which gave insight into the possible motivation for Mister P’s error, which may have been everything but an error. She explained that she never believed in the “random error” narrative, as a “heart and soul”-railway worker like Mister P. would never just forget to ask for permission to depart. Mister P’s personal life, in Miss Haverkamp’s view, went sideways in 1975, when he escaped East Germany by jumping from the locomotive of a cross-border train at Berlin Zoo station, making it to the west but abandoning his wife and two children in the process. He started working at the AKN just a year later, where he met Miss Haverkamp’s father, who took pity in the homeless refugee and took him in. This backfired for Mister Haverkamp, as his wife, whom Miss Haverkamp describes as “an ass and a terrorizing dragon”, began a relationship with the new guy. Things showed a chance to get better for everyone involved when Mister P’s wife and children managed to escape to the west in the early 1980s, moving into an apartment with Mister P. But the abandonment and long separation had consequences, and Mister P’s marriage soon failed, bringing him back to the Haverkamp house. Strain there had increased when Mister Haverkamp had gotten severely ill, and finally escalated in 1994 when his wife discovered that Mister P. had a girlfriend, leading to a violent confrontation where Miss Haverkamp had to rescue Mister P. from her mother, who proceeded to kick him to the curb. So now Mister P. had lost his family for good, had ruined the relationship to his colleague and had lost his home again.
Miss Haverkamp saw him once more when she snuck him into the house to retrieve his belongings, recalling him breaking down in tears in the living room. Something supposedly distinctly out of character for the man. A few days later he sent her a VCR with edited-together home videos of her and her pets, along with what she retrospectively refers to as a “weird and perhaps warning letter” about keeping him in good memory. A few days later, on Mister Haverkamp’s birthday (and what would be the day of the accident), her father received a similar package of train videos and a sentimental letter from Mister P. The telephone would ring a few hours later, just as the family sat down together at the coffee table, with the AKN calling to notify Mister Haverkamp of the accident. Miss Haverkamp says she believes that Mister P. crashed the train on purpose, making use of the not yet upgraded safety system to end a life he saw no purpose in anymore, at the very least ignoring the other people whom his action would place in grave danger. The suicide-theory has been met with varied reactions, from some places stating it as the cause while others refer to it as “tasteless guesswork”. The official side never considered it, remaining with the cause listed as vague “human error”.
Nobody will ever be able to tell for sure why Mister P. departed the station without permission, it’s a piece of knowledge he took to his grave. It may have been an odd error, it may have been the consequences of repeated loss and perceived humiliation. Train drivers acting in suicidal intention are quite rare, not in the least because of the safety-measures limiting their ability to weaponize their trains along with trains, in contrast to aircraft and road vehicles, being rather solidly bound to a predetermined path. The scenario of a train driver committing suicide by crashing their train is reminiscent of pilots crashing aircraft in suicidal intention though, which tragically happens occasionally despite the industry’s best efforts to intervene.
The AKN took full responsibility regardless of why Mister P. acted the way he did, paying out damages to survivors and relatives at least well into the 2010s. VT 2.31, the southbound train, was retired after the accident and used as a parts donor to repair/rebuild VT 2.42, which eventually returned to service. It remained with the AKN until the type’s retirement, even running a service on the final day of the AKN’s VT 2-era in December 2015. It was then sold to a Bavarian rail service provider, being one of just 5 units to escape the scrapyard. As of August 2023 the train appears to still be in service.
Since the accident the line has been equipped with automatic train control, making it impossible for drivers to run a red signal without the trains stopping on their own. Furthermore, when the old VT 2 was retired it was replaced by the Alstom LINT 54, a large modern two-car diesel multiple unit offering vastly improved crash protection. With all that in mind a repeat of the accident is highly unlikely, and if it should happen the result would be less disastrous as the modern trains would allow less deformation under similar impact forces.
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