Background
Schiedam is a city of 80631 people (as of 2023) in the western Netherlands, located to the immediate west of Rotterdam (while not being considered a suburb) and 18km/11mi south of The Hague (both measurements in linear distance).
The city lies on the Hoekse Lijn (“Corner Line”), a double-tracked electrified main line connecting Rotterdam with Hoek van Holland on the coast of the North Sea. Opening between 1891 and 1893 it used to be a major corridor for international express trains, taking passengers from Rotterdam or other European cities to the ferries waiting at Hoek van Holland to take them to England. These trains shared the line with regional passenger services and freight trains at speeds of up to 100kph/62mph.
In order to allow higher traffic frequency on the double-tracked line trains could use both tracks in either direction, with signalling set up to secure them regardless of which track was used in which direction. This was mainly used to let express trains overtake the frequently stopping regional services rather than having to bumble along behind them, needlessly extending travel times.
The Trains Involved
The Rhine Express (train number 215) was a daily international express service from Hoek van Holland to Munich (Germany), consisting of several four-axle express passenger cars pulled, during the Dutch leg of the journey, by NS (Dutch National Railway) 1311. The NS Class 1300 is a six-axle multipurpose electric locomotive, based off the French Type CC 7100. When the type was introduced in 1952 its power output of 3159kW/4236hp made it the strongest locomotive in the Netherlands, predestining it for heavy express and freight services. Each Class 1300 measures 18.95m/62.2ft in length at a weight of 111 metric tons and can reach 130kph/81mph.
Train number 4125 was a regional passenger service from Hoek van Holland to Rotterdam. On the day of the accident it was provided by a pair of NS Materieel 64 Plan V electric multiple units (EMU). The Mat 64, as it’s often referred to, was introduced in 1961 in a four-car (Plan T) configuration, with the two-car “Plan V” following in 1966. Each Plan V measures 52.1m/171ft in length at an empty weight of 86 metric tons and can carry up to 142 passengers at as much as 140kph/87mph.
Train number 4116 was a regional passenger service from Rotterdam Central Station to Hoek van Holland, provided on the day of the accident by a pair of NS Class SGM (nicknamed “Sprinter”) EMUs. The SGM is a two-car EMU introduced in 1975, being somewhat of a successor to the Mat 64 despite never fully/officially replacing the latter. Each SGM measures 52.29m/172ft in length at a weight of 106 metric tons. At the time of the accident the type only existed in two-car configuration, offering 142 seats, with middle cars being added by 1978 to expand capacity. During development focus was given to acceleration due to the close proximity of the stations on the regional services’ lines, dropping top speed to 120kph/75mph while improving acceleration over the Mat 64.
The Accident
On the 4th of May 1976 the Rhine Express has just recently started its journey to Munich after picking up passengers who arrived on ferry from Harwich (UK) early in the morning. Approaching Schiedam station, which it was meant to pass through without stopping, at approximately 7:45am it is running several minutes behind schedule, catching up to the regional service #4125 which was slowing down to stop at the station. Schiedam station has two through-tracks and a third northern track (referred to from here on as the “siding”), which merges into the main line’s northern track just outside the station.
The dispatcher on duty decided to have the express train overtake the regional service regardless of the delay, directing it into the left hand track at Vlaardingen Centrum station 4.5km/2.8mi ahead of Schiedam station. This locked down the (from the Express’ perspective) left hand track between that station and Schiedam station, where the express would merge back into the right hand track after passing through the station at 40kph/25mph.
At the same time an NS SGM providing regional service #4116 from Rotterdam Central Station to Hoek van Holland is standing at the siding in the station. The conductor is dealing with a traveller on the platform who can’t decide if he was going to get on the train or not, keeping the train from departing. Eventually, seeing his own train starting to collect a delay, the conductor decides to not wait for the traveller to make a decision any longer, closes the doors and gives the driver the signal to depart. The driver of the SGM receives the signal from the conductor and accelerates, without checking the signal himself. It’s always green, and if the conductor tells him he’s cleared to depart he must have checked to make sure that it is, he decides.
The SGM leaves the station at 7:53am, quickly picking up speed. The siding merges into the main line a short distance west of the station, which brings the SGM right into the path of the inbound express train right as it overtakes the slowing eastbound regional service in front of it. The SGM is already travelling at 90kph/56mph by the time it reaches the end of the siding. It’s unknown if the SGM’s driver attempts to trigger an emergency stop, it’s not even clear if he as much as saw the express, either way the catastrophe is completely unavoidable by that point. The heavy express train locomotive slams into the SGM head-on at full speed, obliterating most of the leading car before being deflected off the tracks. The driver of the express had jumped from his locomotive after futilely triggering an emergency stop moments before impact, by some miracle managing to miss the overhead wire support poles, and survives with severe injuries. 24 people are killed in the accident, with everyone* in the SGM’s leading car being killed in the collision, a total of 5 people survive with severe injuries while sources claim further “dozens” of injured survivors with no precise number given.
*Some sources claim that 1–3 people survived in the leading car of the SGM.
Aftermath
Most of the SGM’s leading car was destroyed in the collision, with the second car derailing but staying largely aligned with the tracks. The express train had been torn off its locomotive as it derailed, with the leading car being sent off the tracks at a sharp angle while most of the train derails behind it. The collision leaves part of the leading car crushed, sitting at 90° to the tracks. The eastbound regional train overtaken by the express as the accident occurred was struck by debris and scraped by the derailing express train, but got away with minor damage and its occupants unharmed. Had the accident occured just a few seconds earlier, the collision might have thrown the express train headlong into the nearly stationary train, no doubt leading to a far worse outcome.
At first glance, the cause may appear obvious. The express train had been sent into the oncoming track, placing it on a collision course with the westbound regional service. But, as mentioned above, the line, like many in the Netherlands, was set up precisely for this scenario, to let trains overtake on the “wrong” track with signaling to protect them. The driver of the express swears that he ran under green signals, and is backed up by the dispatcher who states that he had decided to let the slightly delayed express train overtake the regional service in front of it in order to limit the express’ delay upon arriving at Rotterdam Central station. The express train was meant to go all the way to Munich, putting it on a substantial delay as early as Rotterdam would create needless difficulty further along the lengthy journey. The overtaking at Schiedam was only necessary because of the already collected delay, the express would have run in front of #4125 had it been on time to begin with.
Direct blame, as it soon turns out, lies with the crew of the westbound SGM. Usually, when it was time to depart, the conductor would check the signal, which would be green, give the order to depart to the driver, who would also see a green signal, and they would pull the train out of the station. A standard procedure performed dozens of times every day. This day, tragically, wasn’t quite the norm.
It takes 1.5 years for the report to be published, but by the end of the investigation the investigators declare that the SGM’s driver, who died in the collision, acted in unreasonable professional trust along with gross negligence, while the conductor, who also died in the collision, acted in pure gross negligence. Their behavior, the investigation finds, was the primary and direct cause for the catastrophic collision, which took the lives of 24 people, making it the Netherlands’ third-worst rail accident in the country’s history.
The express train’s unusual time and place for overtaking the regional service meant that the SGM’s westbound service had no permission to leave the siding, sitting in front of a red signal. The conductor, distracted and likely somewhat annoyed by the indecisive traveller, believed that the signal was green but apparently didn’t actually check, and gave the driver the signal to depart because “the signal is always green at this point”. The driver, rather than checking the easily visible signal himself to make sure, trusted his coworker and the routine he had with the procedure, and departed the station, dooming the train’s to collide.
However, there should have been another factor in play (and frequent readers of this blog know what’s coming). Modern railways are supposed to be set up in a way that protects against disasters from a single point of failure. That means that, if one component in the operation fails (and in this logic the train crew is seen as a component), this alone cannot be allowed to lead to a catastrophic event. A lot of railways used to insist that onboard conductors or two man locomotive crews offer this protection, but professional trust, strict and overbearing crew hierarchy (the driver not taking criticism from an assistant) or simply both people being distracted/negligent have invalidated this argument time and again. Thus, in recent decades, the secondary safety measure used is usually an automatic train control system. These electric systems can detect and track trains as they move through the network, and can autonomously force a train to a stop if it runs a red signal or, in some versions, breaches the current speed limit. This means even if a driver purposely runs a red signal his train will come to a stop, regardless of the driver’s control input.
At the time of the accident the NS was in the process of implementing their automatic train control system (called ATB), but had only covered about 25% of the network by May 1976. Schiedam station, crucially, was not equipped with the system. Here, it was down to the driver to obey the signals, which the SGM’s driver failed to do, having excessive trust in his conductor as well as relying on plentiful routine. In its original form ATB would kick in if a train breaches 40kph/25mph without permission (which would have been sufficient at Schiedam) or runs a red signal at more than that, a later upgrade added the ability to force a train to stop if a red signal is passed at any speed.
The NS went further in the lessons learned from the accident, banning the practice of letting express trains overtake slower regional services on the oncoming track even if signaling for it was installed. From then on they had to slowly follow the regional service if there was no way to overtake without using oncoming tracks. The caused delay, it was decided, was worth the reduced risk of an accident.
The leading SGM-unit had entered service less than a year before the accident, and was rebuilt despite the extensive damage it suffered in the collision. Similarly, the locomotive of the express train was deemed to be worth saving and was repaired, returning to service a year after the accident. The SGM was retired between 2019 and 2021, with 2 units being preserved as museum pieces. Unit 2008, the leading one from the accident, was scrapped in 2019. NS 1311, the locomotive from the express train, was scrapped in 2004, 4 years after the type was withdrawn from service. 4 units of its type remain today, 2 of which are operational.
The accident somehow faded into (for lack of a better word) obscurity in the following decades, to the point of being completely ignored even in publications about rail accidents. The 2010s finally saw a push for public remembrance, in part fueled by anger over a survivor’s book which other survivors called “largely a fabrication”. In 2019, 53 years after the accident, an official memorial was finally unveiled at Schiedam station, consisting of a white wall with an engraved silver metal plate displaying the date of the accident and a verse from a poem:
PAST AND FUTURE DO NOT EXIST IN ISOLATION,
THEIR REALITY IS BORROWED FROM THE NOW
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