Background
Hordorf is a suburb of 734 people (as of 2019), belonging to the city of Oschersleben after losing it’s independent status as a town in 1999. The suburb is located in the eastern-German federal state of Saxony-Anhalt, 33km/20.5mi southwest of Magdeburg and 55km/34mi south-southeast of Wolfsburg (both distances measured in linear distance).
Running right past Hordorf is the Magdeburg-Thale railway, a non-electrified largely single-track mainline connecting Magdeburg in the north with Thale (pronounced like “Taale”, German doesn’t have a special “Th”-pronunciation) to the southwest. Built in the 1870s railway is now nearly exclusively used for slow regional trains, having been downgraded several times in it’s history. The railway gained tragic fame in Juli 1967 when a collision at a level crossing in Langenweddingen (24km/15mi linear distance from Hordorf) caused a fire that killed over 140 people.
Just south of Hordorf station the railway line (going southbound) becomes double-tracked, allowing two trains to pass one another. At the time of the accident the section near Hordorf was set up for a top speed of 100kph/62mph. The DB (German national railway) was in the process of upgrading the route to allow 120kph/75mph, during which an “Indusi”-signal system was gradually installed. That system, required for railway lines with limits above 100kph/62mph, is capable of automatically stopping a train if it runs a red signal and/or gets too close to another train. The installation for the affected section had been scheduled for “late 2008” but then delayed until March 2011. Supposedly, the Federal Railway Authority had redirected 533 thousand Euros/653 thousand USD in funding to other projects, delaying the installation.
The trains involved
Approaching Hordorf from the south was DGS 69192. Provided by the VPS (“Verkehrsbetriebe Peine-Salzgitter”) the freight train consisted of 32 freight cars carrying calcium carbonate from the Rübeland quarry and was headed for a steel mill in Salzgitter. The train’s weight (without locomotives) was listed at 2700 metric tons and it was pulled by two Vossloh G1700–2 BB (numbered 1703 and 1704), the strongest locomotives in VPS’ fleet. These four-axle diesel locomotives weight 89 metric tons each at 15.2m/50 feet long and can reach up to 100kph/62mph, being meant for heavy shunting work or freight trains. As usual for modern locomotives multi-traction (several locomotives at the front of a train) is possible, connecting the locomotives with a special cable means only one driver is needed. The night of the accident that driver is 40 years old Titus S. (no last name is found in any sources), a train driver with 13 years of experience.
Travelling in the opposite direction was HEX 80876, a regional passenger service from Magdeburg in the northeast down to Halberstadt. Since 2005 the passenger service on the Magdeburg-Thale Railway was provided by the Transdev-company under the “Harz-Elbe-Express”-Brand, shortened for marketing to “Hex” (“Hexe” is German for “witch”, and the area around the Harz mountain range has a lot of folklore around witches). On the day of the accident the service is provided by a LINT 41, a two-part six axle diesel multiple unit made by Alstom. Weighting 64 metric tons at 42m/138ft long these small lightweight trains can carry up to 134 seated passengers at up to 120kph/75mph. The version in service with HEX ran in a pure second class configuration and had a crew of two (a driver and a conductor to check tickets).
The accident
On the 29th of January 2011 HEX’ LINT 41 is approaching Hordorf two minutes behind schedule at approximately 10:20pm with just 30 passengers (some sources claim 50, and it’s possible that some survivors wandered off) and 2 crew members on board. Heavy snowfall is filling the air, worsening the low visibility caused by dense fog. The report will later list a visibility of 500m/1640ft, the previous train’s driver estimates little more than a fifth of that. The small train is travelling at 100kph/62mph, heading for the points south of Hordorf station where it will go into the right hand track and pass the waiting northbound freight train. On the day of the accident the freight train is running two hours late, usually it would pass right through the single-track section at Hordorf station and reach the next double-track bit further up north before encountering an oncoming train. But because of the delay it approaches a red signal at the end of the double-track section going approximately 70kph/43.5mph. At 10:24pm the dispatcher in charge of the area sets the LINT’s path, turning it’s signal green. He expected to see the freight train stop at it’s main signal any minute now.
The LINT is only a few seconds away from the points when the freight train barrels past the red signal. The dispatcher immediately sends an emergency stop order, the same second the points report to the signal box that they have been forced out of their set position. Both the LINT and the freight train initiate an emergency stop, but it’s hopelessly too late. Due to the heavy train’s momentum the freight train only manages to shave off about 1kph, while the LINT slows down to 66kph/41mph before impact. At 10:27pm the two trains collide head-on with a deafening bang. The impact of the heavier and stiffer train cracks the lightweight passenger train open, killing the driver on impact. As it breaks apart the LINT causes severe damage to the forward freight locomotive before being thrown off the track to the side, rolling into a field several meters back from the point of impact. The freight train keeps going for another 500m/1640ft, the leading locomotive detaches and only stops another 130m/427ft further down the track.
8 passengers and both crew members aboard the LINT are killed as the train disintegrates on the front of the freight train, another 22 passengers and the driver of the freight train suffer mostly severe injuries.
Aftermath
The noise of the collision is heard in Oschersleben itself, 7km/4mi away, still loud enough to cause people to call the emergency services. Two survivors aboard the train also call in, together with information from the dispatcher responders can find the scene in minutes. They, as well as local residents who are already on site are faced with a surreal sight. Looking at the wreckage from the north makes it look like an oversized model railway suffered some child’s tantrum, the rear of the passenger train looks almost intact as it lies on it’s side in a snowy field. Walking around to the other side, however, reveals something barely recognizable as a train at all.
More than 200 responders pour into the scene, setting up floodlights and trying to get survivors out of the train and also out of the cold weather. The THW (Federal technical relief agency) sets up floodlights, easing the rescue and recovery work in the middle of nowhere. The fire department sends chaplains to the site also, providing emotional and spiritual support for survivors and responders. Ambulances take the survivors to surrounding hospitals, the police shuts down roads were needed. The rescue helicopters have to stay on the ground, it’s too foggy to fly safely. The last victim is recovered from the site of the accident at around 4am, now most responders leave the site as the investigators take over. There is no fault found with either train or the signaling system, turning attention to the freight train’s driver. He’s done the trip several times, with records backing up sufficient knowledge of the route the freight train takes every time. He uses his right to refuse a statement, meaning there’s no certain information from the events on either train ahead of the accident. A theory that is briefly floating around is the fog obscuring the signal’s lights, but at the severity assumed at the time it wasn’t that thick, and even then the data-logger would show the train initiating a stop much earlier. But either train only initiated a stop moments before impact, probably the moment the drivers saw each other’s headlights.
With the investigation on site finishing up the THW cuts the destroyed LINT into smaller pieces to be taken away on flatbeds, the freight-locomotives are towed away along with their train. On the fifth of February the Halberstadt Cathedral, located a few kilometers south of Hordorf, hosts a memorial service attended by over 1000 people, including Saxony-Anhalt’s prime minister, the federal traffic minister and the chairman of the DB’s board of directors.
The data-logger also shows that the freight train had come to a stop 8km/5mi ahead of the collision and parked for 36 seconds. There is no reason to stop on the open track under a green signal, but with the driver refusing to talk to investigators the reason for this stop is never found. The reason could be literally anything, from needing to use the toilet to a phone-call. However, either thing would probably be on record via radio-calls. The official report is published after barely 8 months in September of 2011. It says that the cause of the accident was human error, the driver probably got absorbed in the dull routine and assumed the signals were green as they had been any other day, so he went right through both signals commanding a stop. The accident was aided by the Indusi-System in the area not being complete and low visibility meaning even on straight track the trains only saw one another very late, but the fault lies beyond reasonable doubt with the freight train’s driver. Calculations based on the trains’ speed and position reveal that, had the LINT been running 10 seconds earlier, it would’ve barely reached the points, avoiding a collision by inches. In the meantime, 4 months after the accident, the Indusi-system is completed and activated, making a repetition of the collision impossible. The DB also raises the demands for slower railway lines, now demanding Indusi even for 100kph/62mph top speed. By 2014 all German railway lines are fitted with the system. In January 2012 an official memorial is unveiled near the site of the accident, having been created after relatives of the victims suggested it to Veolia, the subsidiary of Transdev running the HEX-trains. During the unveiling the killed driver is also honored posthumously by the federal state, receiving the “Rettungsmedaille”, a medal for bravery that saved lives. In the reasoning it says that the driver initiated an emergency stop and remained at the controls, trying to slow the train as much as possible, instead of trying to retreat into the passenger area.
On the 8th of October 2012 the trial against the driver starts in Magdeburg, he is charged with several cases each of negligent manslaughter and negligent cause of bodily injury, as well as dangerous interference with rail traffic. On the first day his defense attorney reads a long statement from the driver apologizing to survivors and relatives for the grief he caused and insisting that he did most certainly not see a red signal. He presents himself as a railway enthusiast who takes great care in the execution of his tasks, and he cannot possibly explain how the events that happened could happen. According to the statement his memory of the night has several gaps, recalling seeing headlights in the distance and then hearing the impact, and then there being little memory until he was at the hospital. He knows that, in theory, he must have gone through a red signal (as that is proven), but he can’t explain how it happened. The trial is a massive undertaking, 29 witnesses and experts testify during the trial, eleven lawyers represent 18 relatives and survivors. On the 28th of November 2012 the court sentences the driver to 1 year of probation, following the public prosecutor’s and the defense attorney’s suggestions. One of the lawyers representing the survivors and relatives immediately announces to demand a retrial, saying the sentence should have been closer to the demanded 5 years in jail and that the accident hadn’t been sufficiently investigated. By August 2013 the last chance for this is shot down by the federal court of justice. The LINT is scrapped once the investigation concluded, while both locomotives from the freight train are still in fleet list only 1703 is spotted after the accident. Presumably being the rear of the two locomotives involved and suffering far less damage it was most likely repaired and returned to service, while 1704’s remains have either been placed in storage or already scrapped (note that the public fleet lists aren’t necessarily up to date).
The site today
In December 2012 Hordorf station is closed due to low ridership, although most of it (including the memorial unveiled just months before) remains standing. By December 2018 the HEX-service ends as Transdev loses the bidding for a new contract. Since then the passenger services are provided by Abellio, using the same kind of trains. in an all-white livery.
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